EAA Forum

EAA Booklet - 1

East Asian Academy For New Liberal Arts
Joint research and education program
by The University of Tokyo and Peking University

Recent Past & Remote Past

edited by **Takahiro Nakajima and Hanako Takayama**

EAA

First published June 2020
by East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts, the University of Tokyo

Edited by Takahiro Nakajima and Hanako Takayama

This book was published with the generous support of Daikin Industries, Ltd.

Correspondence concerning this book should be addressed to:
EAA, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan

Publishing Editors: Yoojin Koo, Seitaro Maeno, M. Downing Roberts, Mizuki Uno, Yusuke Wakazawa, Sana Sakihama, Hanako Takayama

Editorial Cooperation: University of Tokyo Press
Book Design: designfolio Co., Ltd.／Yumi SASAKI
Printed and bound: Shinkosha Printing Co.

EAA Booklet 1
Recent Past & Remote Past

Contents

Preface

Takahiro Nakajima

On September 2, 2019, EAA (East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts) organized a conference entitled "Recent Past and Remote Past" at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asian, the University of Tokyo. We invited Professor Yujie Zhu (Australian National University) and Yu Zou (Chongqing University) as guest speakers, while Dr. Sakura Yahata (EAA) and I joined it as EAA representatives. Professors Zhu and Zou are our close colleagues who joined the Winter Institute in 2018 and 2019, jointly organized by Peking University, ANU, NYU, and the University of Tokyo. Before the launch of EAA, we decided to organize a conference on academic themes such as the different modes of representing "pasts" and the institutionalization of our international and transdisciplinary activities.

In the first half of the conference, we talked about EAA as a platform for institutional solidarity between our respective universities. We explored the possibilities of opening an international and neutral platform for academic activities, in contrast to the current situation in which national particularism has become increasingly widespread. Rather than viewing our collaboration as a series of ad hoc activities, we be-

lieve this platform should be institutionalized. We feel there is a need to open up a new, collaborative platform for research and education, specifically geared to engage the coming generation in a global context. Right after this conference, I discussed this idea of a new institutional effort with Markus Gabriel of Bonn University. He also admitted its importance. Now, we are prepared to explore the possibilities of this platform in a world-wide sense.

In the second half of the September conference, we tried to elaborate the topic of representing the "past." We chose this topic as the modes of representing the past to determine our ways of thinking about our current situation. In particular, we focused on two different modes of the past: the recent and the remote past. Sometimes the representation of the remote past affects and contradicts that of the recent past. We often face a problem concerning which past would be better. For example, when we think of the legitimacy of present-day political power, which past would be better to afford it? An opponent could draw on a different past to criticize the status quo. Or, if we consider a completely different past of a different culture, how might we introduce it in a reading of "our" present situation? Could we reconcile it with our pasts?

This topic of plural pasts and their inter-relationship also touches upon the problem of the "canon." We often refer to canons as a way of re-thinking our situation in the present, or as lines of critique to imagine a better condition. What are the criteria by which we might define one canon as being preferable to another? This question may be posed in every discipline — e.g., literature, philosophy, aesthetics, and the study of heritage in general. In this sense, we have been confronted by the problem of constructed traditions.

I hope we can develop this academic platform by elaborating new problematics. We await your participation.

Dialogue

Takahiro Nakajima　Yujie Zhu
Tsuyoshi Ishii　John Zou　Qin Wang

Nakajima　I am very pleased to welcome all of you to EAA today. EAA (East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts) is a new program jointly collaborating with Peking University (PKU). Probably in the near future Australian National University (ANU), and New York University (NYU) will be joining us as well. It is a kind of new academic platform for the Liberal Arts in the twenty-first century, in which we are presently facing a very crucial situation by dividing ourselves into isolated pieces. I believe it is high time to overcome this situation, and by creating this new platform we hope to address it. In the afternoon today, we are going to have a workshop entitled "Recent Past and Remote Past." Before that, thanks to Yujie Zhu (ANU), we would like to have a dialogue on our approach to collaboration. Yujie, could you take the lead?

Zhu　Many thanks, Prof. Takahiro Nakajima, for offering this wonderful opportunity. I totally agree that research is not conducted in isolation, but needs dialogue. So I am very grateful for such a joint collaboration happening among these distinguished universities.

Each institution has its own history and strength, and communication between different institutions always benefits both the researchers and students in the long term.

The question I am thinking about is how we can develop better forms of collaboration. The advantage of interdisciplinary workshops is that we come from different disciplines, and have different strengths. Philosophy could be a very useful foundation for us. History, literature or anthropology could also be useful to consider as case studies. Yet, we actually come from different areas, and we use different methodologies. By posing challenging questions, we benefit from such workshops and symposia, and also what leads to research outcomes, such as a special issue of a journal. It is difficult to develop a coherent idea, in so far as the ways in which we use concepts, topics, and methodologies are different. So, the question of how we develop certain kinds of formats that can benefit from such collaboration in the long term, is very important. Events like these are always inspiring, but how should we move forward, create a roundtable and contribute to some common themes and concepts? This is not an easy task, and it's a challenge to all interdisciplinary research in general. What does collaboration or co-creation entail? How can we co-supervise students and do re-

search together? How can we approach each other, learn from others, and still keep our position or discipline? All of these questions need to be considered.

I think good academic collaboration needs careful design. "Collaboration" is actually a subject in sociology and anthropology, in which you work with the people on the ground, and all are working with the university. Collaboration should be made out of genuine intellectual interest, rather than only aiming at institutional benefits. We know that such cross-intuitional collaboration requires lots of resources, but more importantly it requires careful design. The reality is that people are very busy. If we do not have careful planning, we will find ourselves in a cycle of passively doing things rather than actively creating new values and knowledge. We might be able to learn from some other industry such as Google, Facebook or Apple about the idea of co-creation or co-collaboration. It requires more creative ideas, and more empathy. I am not able to offer solutions, but I would like to raise some questions for us to think about. For instance; how do people develop a long-term mutual understanding? How can people develop a mutual interest?

Nakajima Some possible replies to your questions come to mind. The first one is a very serious reply concerning institutions and institutionalization. How can we institutionalize our international activities by collaborating with international universities? I had been involved in many international activities over the past two decades. I've come to think that we need to have a concrete institution now. EAA is trying to figure out this type of institutional form, jointly organized with PKU, ANU, and others. It is physically based at UTokyo, PKU, ANU and other universities, but it is an academically new institution for the coming generations. How can we jointly educate students or make room for the research of graduate

Takahiro Nakajima

students and faculty members? As you said, we are always traveling in the world to hold events like workshops, conferences, and to then publish them in a book or journal form. That is not so bad, but sometimes feels like an accelerated system akin to the Heideggerian notion of *Gestell*. We are asked to extricate ourselves from this system. What will come next?

I think it must be the creation of an institution. I've been thinking of a possible, concrete institution in East Asia for this purpose. For example, we could imagine a new institution in Okinawa (沖縄) or Jeju (済州) as a space of in-betweeness, a place that condenses the contradictions in East Asia. However, in practice, it would be very difficult to establish a new institution there. That is why I came to think of another possibility, viz., to have it jointly at UTokyo, PKU and other universities. Through this institution, we will share our educational and research experience together, to open up a new way of thinking of our future with new generations. This idea is a point of departure for EAA. EAA is not only limited to an educational and research program. It also aims to include some publication activities in Japanese, Chinese and English, such as book and journal forms for the new generations. We will ask our fellow colleagues to join us in organizing an international editorial board for this. Under this system, we can ask editors to compile our articles into book form, published by UTokyo Press, Iwanami, PKU Publishing Press, or others. We could imagine an EAA book series, lecture series and dialogue series. Or we could pursue the possibility of organizing

some special issues in the *International Journal of Asian Studies* published by Cambridge University Press. I am now the editor in chief of this journal.

Zhu Regarding these concrete ideas of institutional collaboration, within a group of sinologists, we have been developing potential collaborations at the ANU Australian Centre on China in the World, concerning a "Conceptual History of Keywords." Each of our projects has a keyword. This might be, for instance, "Human," "Nation," "Heritage," "Society," "Public," or "Democracy." Each keyword has its own history or routes of travel (they are often translated from Western literature to Japanese and then further translated to Chinese). If the conceptual history of these keywords could be presented in a form of a series of papers or a series of lectures, then the combination of such work would offer us a wider landscape of modern history in East Asia. It's difficult for one scholar to complete such an ambitious project, but joint institutional collaboration could make it possible.

Nakajima Your suggestion reminds me of a project relevant to the "conceptual history" of Reinhart Koselleck. Some universities joined this project, such as the Free University of Berlin and Hallym University, Korea, some years ago. It is an ongoing process, but from my perspective, it has not worked very well. That is a problem. So in this institute, Prof. Masashi Haneda — he is also our director in EAA — has been working on a collaborative global history, inviting Princeton, Free University of Berlin and EHESS, to join this project with UTokyo. This is a very specific activity. There are two intensive courses in summer and winter, yes, each year. So, this week, they are conducting summer school here, but now the project is coming to an end. This, because there are some funding problems, but the major problem is the conceptual, in the

sense that they are trying to figure out what history is. It is a good question, but it is not rooted in a concrete institution or a concrete educational program, and that is a problem.

Tsuyoshi Ishii

Ishii I would like to interject a very brief comment. My idea is very simple but I want to develop EAA to be new kind of university, an open university, and in that sense a university without conditions. The Japanese name of EAA is *Higashi Ajia geimon shoin* (東アジア藝文書院), or *Dongya yiwen shuyuan* in Chinese. The word "academy" is translated into *Shoin* or *Shuyuan* (書院) in the two languages, by which we mean that both researchers and students grow up together by reading all kinds of East Asian classics, including modern or recent classics, and collaborate together with scholars from all over the world. So, I want to develop such an institution, in which all of us engaging in university research and education come together to open up the academic imagination. One of my specific ideas is that we could dispatch students to partner institutes, including ANU, to participate in lectures and intensive discussions, in which the participants are asked to read common classic texts together. We have already launched this program with PKU. Going forward, I want to develop this scheme together with other universities. Of course, we are welcoming Chongqing University to join us, as well.

Zou At present, with all the electronic resources available, we may or-

ganize reading groups with people from different time zones. If we want to have a Hobbes reading group, for example, or to prepare for a workshop of this kind in the future, we can distribute our papers ahead of time and easily make it happen. Some preparation would certainly serve us well, so that when the real event takes place, we may arrive armed with resources. Prof. Nakajima, you noted that we need a location, an actual physical place. I do not know whether the University of Tokyo has, as certain institutions in the US do, access to properties in various cities — for instance a villa in Italy or some other country — where faculty and students are sent yearly. For this, a resident scholar could be appointed on a rotating basis, e.g., an economist for one year, an art historian in the next, and a language professor in the third, so the students would always have a chaperone.

Nakajima Sure. For example, next year I will join a project at Collège de France, rethinking the concept of "evil." It means that we have started to discuss how we could approach such an old theme like evil in the current situation of advanced technology and globalization. As Tsuyoshi said, it is very important to re-read classics, including modern classics, in order to prompt our imagination for setting out new problematics. In the spring semester this year (2019), we organized a lecture series for undergraduate students. The general theme concerned new scholarship to try and think of our future in thirty years, for the sake of a new imagination. These academic challenges from past and future seem to me quite fascinating, especially if they can evoke a new imaginary for us.

Zhu I did something similar in the past. In collaboration with my colleague at ANU, I organized a one-week reading group in 2017, on the subject of heritage and religion in East Asia. Postgraduate students also participated in the discussion. The reading group of-

fered us a solid theoretical foundation for the project. In 2018, we worked with Taiwan Academia Sinica to organize a workshop on the same topic. In this workshop, we focused on detailed discussion of each paper and publication plans. Now, as a result of this project, we are co-editing the papers, to be published together in an edited volume. So reading groups, workshops, and publication meetings could be a nice series of project activities.

Nakajima EAA proposes four research units, including "World Philosophy and East Asia," "World Literature and East Asia," "World History and East Asia," and "Health and the Environment." In the framework of "World Philosophy and East Asia," we are exploring new connections between world and philosophy. This means neither several local philosophies in the world nor a single, worldly, overwhelming philosophy. It interrogates the meaning of the compound of world and philosophy in a philosophically burdened way. In other words, we are thinking of world and philosophy in a different manner from the modern European conceptualization of these two terms.

Zou That is a good idea. Speaking of new connections, a good example would be the term "gentleman," a phenomenon of eighteenth-century Europe, emerging from what Kant would designate as a culture of tutelage. The "gentleman writer," "gentlemen businessman," and "gentlemen politician," designated a new, rising, middle class, cultured or respectable, for deploying the unfettered use of reason. I am probably going a bit far.

Nakajima I am quite fascinated by the concept of the "compound." It is originally a grammatical notion. If we take this notion seriously, we could open up a new conceptual realm for philosophy, literature, and history. For example, almost everyone thinks that "Chi-

nese Literature" is a very natural and smooth compound. It is difficult to find someone who denies its presence in China. In China, there must be Chinese Literature. However, is it really true? If you say there is Chinese Philosophy in China, some would say "oh, no, philosophy does not exist in China." "Philosophy is a European way of thinking." "Chinese 'thought' is completely different from that." If this is the case, we can then ask the meaning of "literature" in China again. "*Wenxue*" is a modern concept engendered in translational activities in Japan. How can we name "literature" or "*wenxue*" again in Chinese? Through these considerations, we need to rethink of the meaning of the compound such as "Chinese literature" or "Chinese philosophy." We are asked to be sensitive to the complex connection between China and literature or philosophy. "Chinese history" has a similar problematic, as well. This manner of compound conceptualization fascinates me.

Zou But that said, critical creativity and the continuation of traditions often hang together. For instance, Shakespearean scholarship could be traced to the late 1600s. If you look at Shakespearean studies closely, there is always change as you move through the centuries. There was a time when, for instance, the verification of the author was a major concern. Such interest still exists, but the most engaging work these days is found elsewhere. Then, with every generation of new scholars, as changes take place, some items on the past agendas are also repeated. That's why, perhaps, we still find some of what Dr. Johnson said about Shakespeare relevant. Likewise, in the humanities, I think creation, or creativeness, is one thing, but a lot of the work also has to do with continuation, with passing along our basic wisdoms or values, things that we cherish and hold closely. It is important that we broaden horizons, open up new spaces, but also do so with memories of the past. Modern scholarship is different from pre-modern scholarship in that it is productive. We

John Zou

have to reach for the new, try to be different, individualistic, and even in some ways positivist in yielding "solid" results that can be verified, authenticated, that can withstand the academic process of testing and critique. But at the same time, I think we, as humanists, are also — and this is how I increasingly see myself as I age — priests of a sort, or vehicles to safekeep and pass on past wisdoms, experiments and moments of cultural and spiritual intensity. When I teach Chinese or Western classics, I understand that I stand beside certain iconic texts to which I direct not only a critical, interrogative interest, but also a sense of wonder, since I cannot reduce them to mere mastered knowledge. I approach such moments of intensity as a steward, the source of whose authenticity may be discovered in a place that is not mine, or at least not only or completely mine. Thus, my understanding is slightly different than Prof. Nakajima's.

Nakajima You are already jumping into our topic. Thomas Kasulis, a specialist of Japanese philosophy, speaks about a very interesting topic. He notes that according to Whitehead, European philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, while Japanese philosophy is a riff on Kūkai (空海). "Riff" is a musicological term of repetition. We can think of a "riff" as a repetition or iteration, in the spirit of Jacques Derrida, when re-reading classics of literature, philosophy or other subjects.

Zou Certainly, it is very poignant. I was listening to a Žižek lecture on

podcast the other day, on the subject of Hegelian theology. Žižek made the point that, already in Hegel, the human recognition of Christian truth indicates God's division within himself. Every recognition is already a distance, i.e., the introduction of a distance between oneself and what one recognizes. And there is always this sense of iterability regarding such differences, produced by the generations of teaching or across the realms of teaching, every time one makes things teachable. To make things teachable, one has to make them different somehow. Otherwise, they become a dead weight, and turn into what cannot be properly taught. But difference is not the only concern, just as God is not only about divisions. As one makes things different in teaching, one also has to make sure that they cohere, i.e., make them almost unteachable. Teaching is therefore something of a struggle against the paradox of the (un)teachability of texts, particularly in the modern academy.

Nakajima It is often said that modernity is a kind of attitude toward making something new. It has been a significant preoccupation for us, for long time now. I think your comments are relevant to the reconfiguration or reformulation of this attitude called modernity.

Zou Thank you, for these kind words. As it becomes a preoccupation, or even an obsession, this interest in the new may also be threatening. Right now, there is a legitimate question, especially from certain conservative standpoints, as to whether it is possible to live in today's world without being different, or without the guilt of being the same, that is, to be an average man or woman without at the same time being accused of embodying something that is culturally outstanding.

Wang I want to return from the ontological to the ontic ground, and I want to return to Prof. Nakajima's fantastic mention of the term

Qin Wang

"compound," which reminds me of one course for which I worked as a TA at NYU. It was taught by my advisor, Jacques Lezra, and the title of the course was "Animal Human." This title, which is apparently a "compound," hardly makes sense. We know what the human animal is, but we do not know what "animal human" is (if it "means" anything), and in that course we read Plato's *Phaedrus*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Shakespeare, Descartes, and so forth. We looked at all of these familiar texts, but via an interesting and creative way in which they are compounded with each other. What is important here is not so much the texts themselves as much as the way in which we approach them. Similarly, if the students here at EAA are simply limited to this space or limited to several locations in, say, Shanghai, New York, and Tokyo, reading these same texts, they are simply changing locations without changing their ways of thinking. For what is important are not the temporal-spatial conditions under which these texts are taught, and similarly not the way in which we select this text rather than another to talk about. What is important is rather how to work out new compound-like conceptualizations from these already too-familiar texts.

This has another dimension, an institutional dimension: in the University of Tokyo, the so-called Hyōshō bunka kenkyū (表象文化研究) is concerned with the cultural studies of representation, which should be a creative response to the contemporary condition of culture. I recall one of my friends complained that nowadays this department or this major has increasingly become the same as the philosophy department, but with a continental empha-

sis. So, the students there are reading Hegel or Kant, or Marx. If that is the case, what is the difference between the two? Why bother to establish a seemingly challenging department, when scholars there are doing the same thing as everybody else has been doing? For me, it is interesting that EAA might be responsible for teaching not only classic texts or ways of reading them, but also creative ways of devising new conceptualizations, so that the students will be confronted with unexpected ways of approaching everyday life. There must be some contact between what they eat, what they drink, what they watch, on one hand, and these classic philosophical or literary texts, on the other hand. But the contact has to be recognized, even invented, from a radical and critical perspective. The contact zone might be violent — it must be violent, and it must be concerned with their everyday lives — with what they are really interested in. For instance, in the present day, Chinese young people are interested in subcultures like cosplay, video games, or anime, and simply teaching Zhuang Zhou will have no avail for them, in so far as their daily life is barely affected.

Nakajima I completely agree with you. Towards this end, I am now trying to overcome the traditional approach to comparison. By introducing modern European comparative studies in every field, Japanese scholars have been doing comparative studies. However, almost of them are "safe" comparisons which serve to reconfirm the identity and difference between the compared terms. They do not touch upon "dangerous" comparisons like "animal human." The challenge posed by "animal human" is an intervention or engagement with our reality. By doing so, we would be able to find a possibility of transforming ourselves, respectively, and to transform the existing order of our world itself. Otherwise, we are just preserving the status quo. We are asked to change our social imaginary in the future. The younger generations, especially, need to have a

new social imaginary, for their own sake. However, it wouldn't be a safe challenge such as that which involves comparison, but rather an interventional challenge to the world, based upon a new compound of concepts. For example, I have been trying to think of a notion of "human co-becoming." When we say that we are "human beings," it is highly Westernized compound of "human" and "being." Should we still think of "human" through "being?" As Gilles Deleuze or the Zhuangzi imagined, a radical transformation in the world and of the world under the name of *devenir* or *wuhua* (物化), it may be much better to think "human" through "becoming" or "co-becoming" rather than "being." If that is the case, we could propose "human becoming" or "human co-becoming" instead of "human being." In this sense, "human co-becoming" may call upon us to think of a non-ethics, because the direction of "becoming" is not a priori fixed. Nonetheless, through this complex compound of "human co-becoming," we would think what the ethical could be. So, maybe this same compound thinking could be useful for us, but it is also quite dangerous. To give another example, Wang Fuzhi (王夫之) speaks of the compound of *li-shi* (理勢). To describe them in a simplified manner, *li* (理) is a principle, while *shi* (勢) is a propensity. By trying to mix these two concepts into one, he shakes up the stability of *li* in the mutual relationship between *li* and *shi*. He says that once *shi* is changed, *li* is also changed. This idea of a compound is a remarkably fascinating idea, but it is at the same time too dangerous.

Zhu That is why you talk about co-becoming?

Zou You have been involved in many new sorts of channels for the investigation for those readings.

Nakajima Maybe the question for all of us concerns thinking a com-

parison between East and West, between China and America, but in a completely different way.

Zou And to build on this, one may suggest that an East Asian standpoint, whether Chinese, Japanese or Korean, is also important. As particularly these days in China there is a new reckoning with the Eurasian region, there might also be a Japanese take on the same, though its implicit ramifications may differ systematically from those entailed in the Chinese position. In some ways the two may overlap, and then in others there must be differences. More broadly speaking, the Japanese were far ahead of the Chinese and Koreans in the early twentieth century in assessing the Euro-Asian cultural balance, in squaring East Asian cultures with Western, European cultures. In recent times, though, there has as yet been little engagement on such intra-East Asian comparisons. They indeed are waiting to take place. Back in the seventeenth century, the Chinese intellectual contact and comparison with Europe was limited to the Jesuits, but today, in the post-global world, be it in the Chinese or Japanese imagination, East Asia's connection with the rest of the world becomes very different. We have to think of the East-West community in a very different sort of light. The US and Western predominance in "East Asian Studies" may continue for some time as is evidenced in the fact that we still use English to communicate across our regional language barriers for this symposium, but there are already some changes. The relative intellectual strengths in the region are undergoing a reconfiguration. Just like the world today looks very different from twenty years ago, as humanists we have to respond to this new human condition under which we are living. As you said, we have to work with students on their social imaginary, but then there is a cultural imaginary. In addition, there is a global imaginary. How do we imagine this world together, in the East Asian community and in the global, cross-regional commun-

ity? What is a good life? What is a feasible life? What is a life that can be made, with all such complications, ours?

Yujie Zhu

Zhu What is the difference between the good life and the feasible life? Is that where Hobbes becomes more relevant? The possible and feasible were both living in times during which they become incompatible. What they want does not or cannot happen. What happens is definitely what they do not want. We are probably not pressed to such extremities as these, but it is not hard to think about possible calamities or possible limit situations. And I think what Prof. Nakajima meant by "dangerous" is probably also relevant to such thinking. Thinking about conflicts and extreme situations ahead of time, in advance, as thought experiments is, as in the old German wording, speculation — speculation as true theory — and so it is. So we are talking about two things here: on one side, there is the social-political context, and on the other there is the production of knowledge. We are talking about the relation between rapture and continuity, between events and crisis. Rapture, such as revolution, creates a new era or political regime. Is it about creativity or about repetition? How can we historiographically and philosophically engage with the changes that follow rapture, but also see them as a kind of repetition?

Nakajima Our discourse is not only an academic discourse. It has its own power to intervene and change our social imaginary. It is obvi-

ous that some politicians consciously or unconsciously use academic concepts in their own way. That is why if we need to change the current political discourse, we have to first elaborate this academic discourse. In the nineteenth century, the Japanese had to face two different types of universalities: a Chinese and a Western universality. Between these two, Japan tried to create a Japanese type of universality in the first half of the twentieth century by working with academic discourses, but this attempt completely failed. In the latter half of the twentieth century, Japan focused itself at a specific standpoint towards the world. In short, the Japanese gave up a claim to universality. However, in the process of globalization, we are again facing the problem of universality. In the present situation, in which both America and Europe seem to retreat from their claims to universality and limit themselves to their own "culture," and as some Chinese scholars attempt to create a Chinese type of universality, the notion of universality seems to have almost collapsed. However, we do not permit ourselves to praise a hard relativism. Without losing a sense of the plurality of the world, we need to think of "universalizing" instead of "universality."

Zhu I recall when we were in Beijing and were talking about civilization as a verb (in the sense of "to civilize"). On one side, this concerns the hegemonic power of the West, directed at the rest of the world (often in the name of colonization, trade, or missions). On another side, it can also be about localization — a way to find our own universal values. These two aspects are actually interrelated, and that is exactly what has been debated in Japan and China about the relation between substance (体) and function (用). What is the fundamental nature of reality? How can we engage with and appropriate Western modernity for our own uses?

Nakajima It is one single process of repetition.

Zhu Again, back to the idea of repetition.

Nakajima I always ask Chinese scholars to consider the pre-war experience in Japan. It was a very destructive experience, but it offers us a good lesson in the mirror of history. We are consciously or unconsciously repeating that structure embedded in the Japanese pre-war experience. It is our task to reflect upon it, in order to open up alternative ways of thinking.

Zou Žižek has an interesting reading of Deleuze, especially concerning the issue of repetition. The latter, foregrounded as mechanistic repetition in the modern industrial age, ultimately describes "the real" which in Žižek's Lacanian terms is nothing but a naked, meaningless repetition as such. Repetition is what is happening. So, we do not want to think of it as something that is dead, since it is the source of all experiences that we may claim as our own. Following this line of thought, every sunrise is a surprise to God himself, even though he is creator of the sun, the moon, and the rest of universe. Alternation takes place within the context of repetition, which is fundamentally meaningless and creatively a priori. Thus every repetition is a surprise, a miracle, because it is the raw givenness of phenomena, of a world in which we find ourselves and meaning.

Nakajima I have a question about this reading. How does Žižek think of God? As you may recall, young Derrida, in his reading of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry*, emphasizes that an idea is produced historically through repetition or iteration. But at the same time, he introduces God to support this system of repetition or iterability. I was rather shocked to read this phrase about the intervention of God in this system of repetition. So, what does Žižek think about this?

Zou Žižek declares himself an atheist. He does not doctrinally subscribe to Christianity. But he also says he is a Christian without believing in Christ, thereby being paradoxical in a provocative way. He is sympathetic to Christian theology in the dialectical sense. At the same time, he insists that he is a historical materialist, a Marxist. In reference to God's being divided in himself, or as mediated by the human reckoning of God, I think he is basically saying that, in the end, we human subjects are still determined by a larger process, even though subjectivity in his Lacanian reading consists precisely of a sort of impossible space, a void or gap within the order of meaning, an order correlated with that process. The subject for Žižek, and for Lacan already, is something of a "derivative" from the epic war between the symbolic and the real.

Nakajima Derrida is not just a naïve believer of religion, but thinks of religiosity.

Zou And Derrida may be more sympathetic to Jewish theology.

Nakajima Yes, that is true. However, unlike Levinas, Derrida did not refer to Jewish theology per se, but to religiosity in general. My concern is that even in a highly sophisticated deconstructive reading of repetition or iterability, we can find this trace of God. How can we think of God today, especially in a "post-secular" society? In this respect, I have a very ambiguous feeling. We have to think of a Derridian God like an extreme pole on the one hand, but on the another hand, we have to rethink the meaning of the secular.

Zou I think the concept of repetition may serve as the subject for a symposium on Eastern repetitions of the West, or repetitions in Eastern and Western philosophies. How are things repeated? How do we view repetitions and figure in them? How do we come to

terms with repetitions in our different paths and styles? How does cultural repetition come to terms with mechanical repetition amidst industrialization? Japan experienced an economic boom in the postwar period. China is undergoing the process in a global epoch. Korea went through industrialization during the episode in between. So probably we can all talk about our differences with regard to repetition, which is a time-honored idea in the region, prominently captured in the Chinese classics in terms of 统 (tradition), 系 (system), and even 绳 (rope, as verb and noun), all defaulting to the 系 (thread) radical. It would be interesting to explore how these terms are deployed, translated or rewritten in the modern East Asian languages, how they are repeated, circulated and set against earlier significations.

Nakajima Maybe we could talk about trans-repetition.

Zou Yes, trans-repetition.

Wang Exactly. I think we should still remember Marx's words on religion, namely religion the opium of the people, but it is also the expression of their humiliation.

Zou A sign of the oppressed.

Wang Exactly. Just now, you mentioned Žižek's critique of Deleuze. Žižek somewhat reversed Deleuze's expression of bodies without organs by saying that actually it is an organ without bodies. So if daily life is already tuned as that which operates according to all kinds of rules and tenets determined in late capitalism, if our very life has become a kind of mechanical repetition of meaningless procedures, then what Deleuze imagined as productive is actually hellish.

Zou From a Deleuzian viewpoint, modernist productivity probably does partake in a comic release of energy, where he compares repetition to some rat race, or a rhizomic growth in contrast to the tree metaphor in a lot of classical, indeed pre-Deleuzian philosophies. What distinguishes the energy in rhizomic thinking is that the latter does not have a particular direction or form. Things just spread, with speed and abandon. In thinking, it captures a process that is radically non-dialectic, so as to abolish the Hegelian and Freudian systems. What Žižek tries to do is to redeem the Lacanian, Hegelian and in the end Marxist dialectic in this context. That is why he would say things like Deleuze misses Hegel at the most essentially Hegelian moments, etc., and tries to show that radial relentless repetition always forms the a priori dimension of dialectical thinking. The point is to prove that the Deleuzian attack on the dialectic is based on a flawed notion of the latter. In the meantime, Žižek certainly makes it possible to think about Lacan, Hegel and Marx in new and radically productive ways.

Wang Exactly, but what Deleuze said in the 1960s, for example, when he proposes that we replace the logic of "is" by the logic of "and," which is akin to saying that one thing can be connected with another thing even though they are totally heterogeneous with each other, or rather, because of the heterogeneity we can relate A to B and C, so that we can find new kinds of possibilities — political as well as cultural — out of this kind of connection. This logic may no longer function in the present day. Indeed, we need to work out new connections, but even this motivation or will has to be put under scrutiny when social conditions or modes of production change.

Zou It is also to abolish the phenomenal and a nominal. You cannot fix things there. There is always this sliding liaison between things.

You slide from one thing to the next, but you cannot actually fix upon anything. Deleuze wants to destroy western metaphysics and the dialectic thinking that gives it necessary support. Compared to Deleuze, Žižek is more of a cultural "conservative," to the extent that he reserves primacy for an assortment of intensities that are a posteriori, so to speak. He still conceives the machine age as a time and event that opens up spaces for the subject, instead of one that annihilates the very possibility of subjective articulation.

Nakajima In this sense, the Deleuzian compound notion of "transcendental empiricism" is a totally contradictory term. Nonetheless, we do not live in an oversimplified world. We live in a complex world that requires a complex engagement. It is our fortune to have fellow colleagues who join the EAA project in which we will elaborate our own complex engagement with the world. I hope we will continue this dialogical and critical engagement, to elaborate our concepts altogether. Thank you so much for joining us today.

Papers

Yujie Zhu

Sakura Yahata

John Zou

Takahiro Nakajima

1

Remembering the Chinese Past:

The Remote and the Recent

Yujie Zhu

Introduction

Since the early twentieth century, heritage, museums and memorials have played active roles in constructing and reinterpreting the social memories of nation-states and sub-groups within the national population (Lowenthal 2015). These public and material modes of commemorating the recent past function as soft, but nonetheless powerful, political tools in nation building and social cohesion. David Lowenthal, one of the leading historians and heritage scholars, wrote a book *The Past is a Foreign Country*. In the book, he argued that the past is not in the past; but being used for the present. The interpretation of the past is never fixed, but always in a constant process of making and remaking. Powerful state narratives are not monolithic and unchanging; rather they become *lieux de mémoire* (sites of memory) that adapt continuously to changing economic and political demands (Nora 1989; Winter 1995).

China's emerging status as a great global power cannot be understood without a deep comprehension of how its recent past shapes Chinese visions of national identity. The major historical events that have

influenced China through the last 120 years, including the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the Economic Reform (1978–), have played crucial roles in determining the nation's governance and diplomatic relations. With the collapse of socialism as the nation's overarching political system, and the rise of globalisation and marketisation, a new web of multifaceted narratives about China's recent past has taken shape through memorials, museums and popular culture. We need to engage with these new narratives to understand what shapes China's roles in national, regional and global issues.

In this paper, I examine how modern China remembers its remote and recent past. The simple division of the recent and remote past of China is the Chinese Revolution of 1911 (辛亥革命). However, the realities might be more complex than that. What follows is a discussion of the differences and similarities between the recent and remote past. How does the recent past become the remote? How do such changes reflect the ongoing social-political context of modern China?

Heritage Politics and the Remote Past

Following the rise of a new dynasty, the incoming emperor would often eradicate the legacy of their predecessor to legitimise their claim to authority. This process of destruction would result in the removal of material architecture and objects, as well as the re-writing of the past. In place of this destruction, new architecture, such as palaces and monuments, would be erected, and new histories written that accentuate the new emperor's origins. This rise and fall of material culture (Rizzardi and Hankun 2018) started with Emperor Qin Shihuang, who removed evidence of the past, particularly books and other scholarly material, in order to establish a new, unified kingdom (Chan 1972; Mayhew 2012). The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the cultural revitalization of the past decades are in a similar vein to this process of destruction and

reconstruction. Discussed below are several forms of this process as orchestrated by officials and public participants.

Much of the work of the remote past has focussed on reconstructing Chinese civilization in response to nationalising agendas (Wang 2013). The State Administration of Cultural Heritage (SACH) protects over 500,000 immovable sites and relics. Sites such as the Forbidden City, the Mausoleum of the First Qin Emperor and the Great Wall have been reinterpreted to fit with a national agenda. Specifically, these sites are re-constructed to represent an evolving nation whose long history emphasises a Han-centred narrative. In effect, the inclusion of such sites — the re-construction and interpretation of them in response to national agendas — is a form of destruction and re-construction: inclusion or exclusion on a list of cultural heritage either ties it into the national narrative or destroys it.

Second, as part of this reconstruction into a national narrative, certain cities are similarly rebranded and re-constructed to emphasise their connection to important periods in China's history (Zhu 2018a). For instance, Beijing has become closely associated with its role as capital of the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1912). Similarly, the city of Luoyang is in a process of rebranding itself — through changes to its urban landscape — to emphasise its important status during the Wei-Jin period (220–589). Other cities, such as Nanjing emphasise its role as a capital city for collapsed dynasties and the Republic-era governments (Zhu 2018a). Each of these re-constructions is designed to fit with national cultural narratives, which in turn mirrors nationalising discourses (Oakes 1993). As a consequence of this rebranding and re-construction, these cities become part of the "tourist gaze" (Urry 1990).

Third, in response to the "tourist gaze" emphasised within these re-constructed and rebranded sites, local sites compete with each other for recognition, and to maximise cultural and social capital. These competitions are often framed by who owns the historical culture or who has roots or connections to it. For instance, there has been a continuous

debate in the media and scholarship about which city — Chang'an or Luoyang — should be the start of the Silk Road.[1] On 22 June 2014, at the thirty-eighth meeting of the World Heritage Committee in Doha, Qatar, the Silk Routes: Chang'an-Tianshan Corridor application was approved.[2] Since the idea of Silk Road is a symbolic expression that refers to a shifting network of various trails, tracks, contacts between people and places, it is difficult for officials to give a right answer. Therefore, to name the starting point of the Silk Road is not a geographical or historical decision but a political act of competition and branding.

Fourth, aside from the material aspects of engaging with the past, remembering the remote past also refers to the revitalization of cultural tradition through intangible heritage. China's ratification of the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention in 2004 and the UNESCO best practices in 2005, shifted its attention from purely material culture to intangible culture. This has had a significant impact on how the past is understood and engaged with, under the purview of national cultural agendas.

Yet re-construction and reinterpretation of the past it not limited to local, provincial and national governments alone. Local communities are increasingly engaging with China's remote past. Private entrepreneurs engage with this history through the creation of local museums that display local traditions and community life (Song 2008). Others, such as ethnic communities, also engage with this past through the tourism industry (in China and abroad). Within this tourism sphere, they

1) The debates can be found here http://m.21jingji.com/article/20140627/b849727257035a27eba65b389f149dd4.html

2) As defined by UNESCO (Jing 2005), cultural route is "a composed of tangible elements of which the cultural significance comes from exchanges and a multidimensional dialogue across countries or regions, and that illustrate the interaction of movement, along the route, in space and time" (UNESCO Operational Guidelines). Example of nominated cultural routes can be Great Wall, Darjeeling Railway, and Camino de Santiago.

seek "authentic" cultural practices related to their intangible cultural heritage (Zhu 2018b).

Each of these elements contributes to a discourse of continuity and timelessness of the remote past in the present. As part of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, negative aspects of the past, such as violence and war in Imperial China, have been diluted or left out; a romanticised vision of the remote past has been constructed. This re-construction or rebranding of the remote past has a political aim: to legitimise modern China's claim to its ancient roots and civilization.

However, the consequence of this nationalising narrative is a forgetfulness of other aspects of China's past. In maintaining the continuity of this narrative, certain histories are forgotten, such as the rule of the Manchurians and the involvement of minority groups including the Mongols, Tibetans, Muslims and others. The official construction of the glorious Chinese remote past has a powerful homogenising effect wherein the Han Chinese are emphasised while other groups are collectively framed under the Han Umbrella. In other words, the culture of 'otherness' has been marginalized through the official construction of the remote past.

Remembering and forgetting the recent past

Before illustrating how China remembers its recent past, we need to understand what is the recent past, or more precisely, how recent is the recent past? The answer to this question, I believe, varies for each country. China is very different from Germany, Japan and Australia. I argue the answer to this question is not fixed, but constantly changing. This is a socio-political decision making and does not have a fixed time or clear definition. It's always being made and remade based on current political regimes and agendas.

China's emerging status as a great global power cannot be understood without a deep comprehension of how its recent past shapes Chi-

nese visions of national identity. Below are three cases studies that show the dynamics of social memory construction. Each of them represents one of the most significant narratives of the twentieth century — colonialism (殖民), revolution (革命) and war (战争) — that shape the foundation of modern China (Anagnost 1997).

The Semi-Colonial past

From the mid-1800s China has been subject to considerable foreign intervention, notably the cessation of Hong Kong, Shanghai and Huangzhou to the British in 1842 and railroad rights to Germany in the late 1800s. As a result of this influence, China has been subject to Western cultural influence across significant portions of its geography and urban areas. As part of the legacies of Western imperialism and semi-colonialism (半殖民), Western architecture was built in these areas, which included train stations, churches, monuments, factories and schools. Nowadays, the "semi-colonial era" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are being used to promote urban centres associated with images of old Shanghai and old Hong Kong (Chan 2018).

A key site in the controversial history of Western colonialism in China is the Bund in Shanghai. Growing from an international settlement in the late nineteenth century, the Bund used to house numerous western banks, trading houses and social clubs (Henriot 2010; Bickers 2014). The Chinese government removed many colonial statues after 1949, in which the statue of Angel of Peace is a good example. The monument was initially used to commemorate the First World War for both foreigners and Chinese in Shanghai. Part of the foundation of the statue was demolished by the Japanese military during the 1930s. In the 1950s, discussions were made by officials and scholars on how to deal with the rest of the statue, including a plan to turn it into a socialist monument. The plan was never been realized and the rest of the monument was demolished during the Cultural Revolution.

Since the 1980s, Shanghai urban redevelopment has promoted in-

ternational influence in the Bund to renew its reputation as one of the largest cosmopolitan cities in the world. As part of this renewal, the Bund and its buildings were listed as national heritage in 1996. In this ongoing process of heritage-making, the social memories of the colonial past are reconstructed to serve the needs of modern consumption for both domestic and international tourists. Unlike other colonial sites in the Asia-Pacific region, the interpretation of the Bund has transformed the site's negative past into something glamorous for nation building on the global stage.

The Revolutionary past

Unlike the English or French definitions of revolution, the Chinese term *geming* refers to the idea of dynastic change. Different from the idea about the reformation of a political system, Geming refers to the ancient ideology of the relation between the empire and heaven that Ming (命) indicates the Mandate of heaven (天命). It was after the 1911 revolution that Chinese revolutionaries, such as Sun Yatsen, translated the Japanese term *kakumei* into Chinese, importing the Western ideas of Revolution into Chinese practice. Mao Zedong used the same ideas of Geming to develop his thoughts and ideology. Based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, Mao's goal for the revolution was not only to unite the country like Sun Yatsen, but to destroy all of the feudalistic past and create a new world: to "develop China's 'new national culture' and increase "national self-confidence," Mao wrote, "it is necessary to understand the development of ancient culture and to assimilate its democratic and revolutionary character" (Ho 2017: 2). Consequently, the government led by Mao Zedong endeavored to establish a unified socialist culture; a culture that sought to align itself with scientific, democratic, and revolutionary ideas.

Nowadays the Chinese revolution has been turned into a romanticized version of culture. Along with a collective amnesia of mass torture and violence, the Chinese government has promoted red songs and

dance referring to the legacies of the revolutionary period. Chinese museums, such as the Marco Polo Bridge museum, serve as a tool to foster patriotic sentiments among the Chinese populace (Denton 2005). In particular, museums have played a role in "patriotic education campaigns" in which state employees, party cadres and the youth visit "revolutionary heritage sites" to learn about the CCP's past achievements (Zhao 1998).

The recent transformation of the Liu Landlord Museum in Sichuan illustrates how China remember and interpret its revolutionary past. From the 1950s to the 1960s, Liu Wencai was considered to represent the landlord class, and a target of class struggle (Piao 2016; Ming 2005: 45). Part of this identification was a result of his family's ownership of a 70, 000 square-metre manor in Anren, Sichuan. As Dennis Ho (2017) notes, the display of historical objects, was not only to instil a "correct understandings of history, of nation, and revolution" in its viewers, but they were foremost "meant to spark political awakening, to create a revolutionary narrative that included the viewer, and to motivate him to participate in its realization" (Ho 2017: 23). In other words, museums took on a role as facilitators and instigators for the communist revolution, serving to direct and reinforce the beliefs and actions of the masses (Ho 2017: 23–24).

An example of this mobilisation can be seen in the Landlord museum, wherein the display of display of 'truth' was tied into ideologies of class differences. Within this museum Liu Wencai, a landlord, became the face of "detestable landlords" throughout China and an exemplar of class inequality (Wang 2010: 45). Within this space, good (the people) and evil (the landlords) were contrasted against each other. The effect of this comparison was a deeply rooted image of class difference and Liu Wencai as a detestable person. This image was further emphasised following tours around the country to display influential sculpture exhibition — Rent Collection Courtyard (Chen 1999: 59–61). Ultimately, this continuation reinforced ideas of class difference and struggle, which

served the current regimes purposes in guiding people's beliefs (Ho and Jie 2016).

Ideological changes form 1985 saw a shift away from class difference and a re-evaluation of stories related to such ideologies. Following an investigation into the Liu family, the image of Liu Wencai as a detestable figure was found to false. This resulted in changes to his image, such as replacing 'torture chamber' with 'chamber for Spring Festival goods' (Ming 1999: 49). The museum has also changed its name in recognition of the investigation: no longer the Landlord Manor Museum, it is now the Dayi Liu Family Manor Museum. Nowadays, the museum is a popular tourist destination for the small town. The public interest in the revolutionary past has fuelled tourism in the area and stimulated a market-driven expansion of activities. These activities include cultural performances and special exhibitions on antique furniture and dress (Dayi Liu Family Manor Museum, 2019). This emphasis responds to tourists and tourist expectations of the past, which results in ongoing transformations to public memory in regard to the Liu Family history.

The War Past

One of the major forces the construction of contemporary museums and history in China was the Second Sino-Japanese war, fought between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan between 1937 and 1945. The origins of the war stem from a conflict arising on the Marco Polo Bridge, in which Chinese and Japanese troops entered into a battle following an altercation. Following this, the Japanese army proceeded to capture several Chinese cities including Nanjing, the capital of China under General Chiang Kai-Shek (the Kuomintang, e.g. Qian 2009: 9). What resulted from this occupation became known as the Nanjing Massacre — a six-week period in which the Japanese army pillaged properties, raped women and murdered approximately 300, 000 civilians, including children and unarmed soldiers.

Recognition and Commemoration of the Nanjing Massacre has

evolved over time. The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in Nanjing examines China's shifting attitude towards the painful memories of the Japanese invasion during World War II. Over the last few decades, attitudes to the massacre have shifted from celebrating heroism and victory to promoting a victimised image of the Chinese nation (Qian 2009). This dramatic shift in the official narrative occurred as China sought to counteract Japan's whitewashing of its imperial past (Eykholt 2000). The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall has become one of the most significant sites of memory in China, reflecting the dark history and uncomfortable international relationship with Japan.

Three key stages of remembering the Nanjing Massacre have been identified by scholars as providing an important insight into how national memory uses difficult history and war to create an identity and social memory (Eykholt 2000; Reilly 2001; Yoshida 2006; Coble 2007; Alexander and Gao 2012;). Stage 1 (1946–1981) involved a process of forgetting, as part of a larger endeavour by the PRC to recognise other events that aligned with their socio-political policy — the need to venerate the class struggle and victory over the KMT and Japanese invaders.

Stage 2 (1982–2010) concerned a re-evaluation of the Nanjing Massacre as a response to the Japanese government's revision of their involvement in WWII; particularly their portrayal as aggressors and imperialists, to a more moderate or strategic image of their conduct as aligning with war principles within school textbooks. This shift resulted in the nationalisation of the Nanjing Massacre and the creation of international exhibitions and events that were designed to challenge the Japanese government's narrative. This response also included the creation of research institutions and the funding of research projects into the events and recollections of the Nanjing Massacre. These included the production of scholarly works, popular narratives, films and the collection of testimonies from Chinese and foreigner peoples alike. One testimony collected was the diary of John Rabe, which illustrated his experience of the Nanjing Massacre, but also served to legitimize the Chinese narrative

of events.

Recent changes have been considered as Stage 3 (2010-present), but primarily concern an international recognition of China's recount of events. In this stage, commemoration of the event is considered important to all Chinese, not just the immediate victims or domestic Chinese, but Chinese people all over the world. This global recognition was further enhanced in 2015 by the submission of the Nanjing Massacre onto the UNESCO Memory of the World. In this way, the event and narrative being put forward have become legitimised through this universal document.

The ideological shift away from forgetting or 'collective amnesia' concerning the Nanjing Massacre to remembering and commemorating it required a significant cultural stimulus. This shift, thus, saw the collection of various testimonies and objects, and creation of various memorials, museums, sites of memory and statues. As a consequence, the curation and exhibition of cultural material is part of a process of 'memory construction,' rather than remembrance. As a process of heritage making of the war past, the construction of the Memorial not only offers the state a powerful platform for patriotic education, but also shows how China uses the 'heritagisation' of its past to fulfil diplomatic goals in the Asia-Pacific region.

Discussion: the recent and the remote

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the People's Republic of China has transformed itself into a market economy that is deeply integrated with global economic and political power structures. From the late 1970s, the Chinese state has been confronted with the challenge of searching for new forms of legitimacy. My research on the politics of cultural heritage in China (Zhu 2016; Zhu and Maggs 2020) showed how the Chinese state created official narratives, sites and performances of cultural heritage in order to shape imaginaries that refer to

a refurbished and splendid past. Such imaginaries of the past facilitate the reaffirmation of the people's national identity, and at the same time enhance the nation's image on the world stage (Zhu 2018a).

This process leads to the question of remembering the past: what are the similarities between remembering the recent and remote past? As the above examples demonstrate, both the recent and the remote are used as political and cultural tools to legitimise and authorise economic and political interests within state and non-state actors. As with other nation-states (Smith 2006: 50), China uses this tool to establish a political legitimacy when negotiating aspects of the past. However, this process, and indeed the outcome of legitimacy, is tied into economic development and modernisation (Holbig 2009; Yang and Zhao 2015). Therefore, the CCP has a strong interest in promoting its past achievement in facilitating continued economic prosperity.

In addition to these motivations, another similar, perspective of remembering the recent and remote past is its cultural effects of creating a homogenised national culture. Both of them serve the current political regime to show the idea of progress, development and the sense of continuity. The public display of museums, heritage sites and monuments offer concrete evidence that PRC does not only have seventy years history, but the country also embraces a thousand years civilization. To increase national self-confidence, they show a linear, progressive historical development of the Chinese history.

However, there are also differences in terms of the ways and its consequences to remembering the recent and remote past. Despite the remains of historical books, local gazettes and archaeological findings, the evidence of the remote past is relatively vague. The violent or shameful nature of the remote past, such as wars or massacre, might be diluted or re-interpreted and used for political purposes. Yet, while the remote past can sometimes be rewritten or romanticised with a relatively high degree of public consensus, the interpretation of the recent past is not always an easy task. As shown in the war, revolution and colonial exam-

ples, the violence and trauma of China's recent past is difficult to reconstruct into a unified set of social memories. This is largely due to the effects of revolutions, wars, civil unrest, repression, massacres and ethnic exclusions are still felt, and exist for many citizens within their living memory. They are often emotionally engaged and difficult to be interpreted unless the authorities are capable of using certain cultural techniques to deal with them. Once these historic events are transformed into narratives through sites of memory, some aspects of the past are silenced while others are reinterpreted for political use. Such process does not only engage with active remembrance but also a collective amnesia.

Here, a comparative metaphor of Western ghosts and Chinese zombie (*or called hopping zombie*) might help us understand the effects of the remote past and recent past in shaping contemporary society. The remote past might sometimes be understood as Jacques Derrida (1993)'s sense of haunting (ghosts). In a haunted place, ghosts are not visible, but they might raise spectres that still create a sense of different feelings. The ancient Chinese civilization is so remote and invisible, but still affects Chinese people's daily life in various ways. Unlike Western concepts of ghosts, Chinese zombies reanimate due to certain social and political reasons; they can suddenly rise and attack people. Like the Chinese zombie then, the seemingly peaceful recent past can sometimes be unsettled again due to controversies and practices of counter-memory, alongside political and community changes.

Although China continues to function as an authoritarian state, the formation and transformation of social memories is never homogenised and fixed, but rather is shaped by shifting political and economic agendas and the contested voices of local communities. For instance, the representation of Liu Wencai as an adversarial landlord was contested. People who had lived with him and his family contested the 'authenticity' of the stories that pictured Liu Wencai in this manner, particularly those found in museums. Scholars such as Xiaoshu conducted investigation of Liu's life and published a historical book *The Truth of Liu*

Wencai (Piao 2016). Meanwhile, others, such as Liu Xiaofei (the grandson of Liu Wencai), actively engaged with the media to present a "true story," to counter the mainstream representation of Liu Wencai (Piao 2016; Ho and Li 2016). In addition to writing articles online, Liu Xiaofei organized Liu family gathering meeting in 2010; about 600 members attended the meeting and commemorated their ancestors.

However, as a result of political influence and a lack of public space or mechanisms for a civil society, acts of counter-memory are often fragmentary and temporary. In other words, they achieve short-term goals for certain interest groups without being able to offer a sustained counter-memory or sense of community cohesion.

Conclusion

This paper examines the ways modern China remembers its past. As shown in the examples of both the remote and recent past, I argue that the state has used different techniques of memory formation, such as the uses of heritage sites, memorials and museums, to interpret and remember its particular kinds of pasts for commemoration and public display in building national images.

However, the formation of official memory does not simply concern remembering: certain pieces of evidence of the past need to be erased — a phenomenon of collective amnesia — to facilitate the building of the homogenised, progressive national culture. During this process of creating a unified version of Chinese official memory, certain groups' past has been highlighted, while others, such as minorities including women and victims, have been forgotten.

China is not the only country engaging with its national memory work. At the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new European Union, the construction of social memory emerged as a significant political tool in the conceptual and material reconstruction of nation-states (Dickinson et al. 2010).

The events and narratives of apartheid in South Africa, for example, are famously controlled and displayed in museums to develop a national consensus about that difficult past (Teeger and Vinitzky-Seroussi 2007). Hiroshima has been reconstructed as a "City of Bright Peace" through memorials and heritage tourism to commemorate atomic bomb issues (Zwigenberg 2014). Yet, is there a way to move beyond nationalism and the politics of agency? Is there a way to engage with memory work that facilitates dialogues of inclusiveness, reconciliation and peace making for the future? Future research can engage with comparative cases around the world to examine the different paths of memory work and develop possible channels to form our senses of the past, not in the name of nationalism, but with the view of cosmopolitan spirit.

Acknowledgement

Early version of the paper has been presented in the workshop 'Recent Past and Remote Past' at the University of Tokyo in September 2019 and the Seminar Series of the Humanities Research Centre of the Australian National University in October 2019. I would like to thank Takahiro Nakajima, Sakura Yahata, Yu Zou, Jay Winter, Bruce Scates and Tessa Morris-Suzuki for their generous comments. I also like to thank Patrick Baily for his efficient research assistance.

References

Anagnost, A. (1997). *National past-times: Narrative, representation, and power in modern China*. Duke University Press.

Alexander, J., & Gao, R. (2012). Mass murder and trauma: Nanjing and the silence of Maoism, In. *Trauma. A social theory. London: Polity*, 118–165.

Bickers, R. (2014). Moving stories: Memorialisation and its legacies in treaty port China. *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 42(5), 826–856.

Chan, S. C. (2018). Heritagizing the Chaozhou Hungry Ghosts Festival in Hong Kong. In Maags, C., & Svensson, M. (Eds.), *Chinese heritage in the making: Experiences, negotiations*

and contestations (45–168). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Chan, L. M. (1972). The burning of the books in China, 213 B.C. *The Journal of Library History,* 7(2), 101–108.

Chen, M. 1999, Investigation of the truth of great landlord, Liu Wencai's manor (大地主刘文彩庄园真想调查), *Shanghai Archives*, no. 4, 57–63.

Coble, P. M. (2007). China's "new remembering" of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–1945. *The China Quarterly*, 190, 394–410.

Dayi Liu Family Manor Museum, 2019, *About*, viewed 1 October 2019, <http://www.dylszybwg.com>.

Derrida, J. (1993). *Specters of Marx: The state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new international*. Routledge.

Dickinson, G., Blair, C., and Ott, B. L. (eds.). (2010). *Places of public memory: The rhetoric of museums and memorials*. University of Alabama Press.

Eykholt, M. (2000) Aggression, victimization, and Chinese historiography of the Nanjing massacre, in Joshua A. Fogel (ed.), *The Nanjing massacre in history and historiography*. University of California Press, 11–69.

Henriot, C. (2010). The Shanghai Bund in myth and history: an essay through textual and visual sources. *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 4 (1), 1–27.

Holbig, H. (2009). Remaking the CCP's ideology: Determinants, progress, and limits under Hu Jintao. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs,* 3, 35–61.

Ho, D.Y. & Li, J. 2016, From landlord manor to red memorabilia: Reincarnations of a Chinese museum town, *Modern China*, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 3–37.

Ho, D. Y. (2018). *Curating revolution: Politics on display in Mao's China*. Cambridge University Press.

Lowenthal, D. (2015). *The past is a foreign country — revisited*. Cambridge University Press.

Mayhew, G. (2012). The formation of the Qin Dynasty: A socio-technical system of systems. *Procedia Computer Science,* 8, 402–412.

Ming, H. 2005, The stories behind Liu Wencai's manor (刘文彩庄园背后的故事), *Corpus of Party History (党史文汇)*, no. 10, pp. 45–50.

Nora, P. (1989). Between memory and history: Les lieux de mémoire. *Representations*, no. 26, 7–24.

Qian, F. (2009). Let the dead be remembered: Interpretation of the Nanjing massacre memorial, in Logan and Reeves 2009.

Oakes, T. (1993). The cultural space of modernity: Ethnic tourism and place identity in China. *Environment and Planning C: Society and Space,* 11(1), 47–66.

Piao, V. (2016). *Rectification of name of grandfather: Grandson of the great landlord, Liu Wencai, one man in the fight (为祖父正名：大地主刘文彩之孙的孤军奋战)*, New York Times, viewed 19 August 2019,

<https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20160811/cc11chinalandlord/>.

Reilly, J. (2004). China's history activists and the war of resistance against Japan: history in the making. *Asian Survey*, 44(2), 276–294.

Rizzardi, P. A., & Zhang, H. (2018). *The condition of Chinese architecture*. Singapore: TCA Think Tank. London: Artifice Books on Architecture.

Teeger, C., and Vinitzky-Seroussi, V. (2007). Controlling for consensus: Commemorating apartheid in South Africa. *Symbolic Interaction* 30(1), 57–78.

Yang, H., & Zhao, D. (2015). Performance legitimacy, state autonomy and China's economic miracle. *Journal of Contemporary China,* 24(91), 64–82.

Yoshida, T. (2006). The Nanjing Massacre. Changing Contours of History and Memory in Japan, China, and the US. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*.

Urry, J. (1990). *The tourist gaze: Leisure and travel in contemporary societies*. London: Sage Publications.

Wang, Y. (2010). Great landlord, Liu Wencai: reconstruction of collective memory (大地主刘文彩: 集体记忆的重构), *China through the Ages (炎黄春秋)*, no. 2, pp. 43–45.

Wang, G. (2013). *Renewal: The Chinese state and the new global history*. Hong Kang: The Chinese University Press.

Winter, J. (1995). *Sites of memory, sites of mourning: The Great War in European cultural history*. Cambridge University Press.

Zhu, Y. (2016). Heritage making of Lijiang: Governance, reconstruction and local Naxi life, in C. Brumann and D. Berliner (eds.), *World heritage on the ground: Ethnographic perspectives.* Berghahn, 78–96.

Zhu, Y. (2018a). Uses of the past: Negotiating heritage in Xi'an. *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 24(2), 181–192.

Zhu, Y. (2018b). *Heritage and Romantic Consumption in China*. London: Routledge.

Zhu, Y. (2019). Politics of Scale: Cultural Heritage in China, in T. Lahdesmaki, S. Thomas and Y. Zhu (eds), *Politics of scale: New directions in critical heritage studies*. Berghahn, 21–35.

Zhu, Y. and Maags. C. (2020). *Heritage Politics in China: The Power of the Past*. New York and London: Routledge.

Zwigenberg, R. (2014). *Hiroshima: The origins of global memory culture*. Cambridge University Press.

Zhao, S. (1998). A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies,* 31(3), 287–302.

2

A New Mythology in Art from Schelling's Philosophy of Art

Sakura Yahata

Introduction

In this paper I suggest that mythology provides a way of thinking about the past. Since ancient times, mythological figures and stories have recurred across various artforms. One thinks of mythological themes in symphonic music, in historical painting (landscapes and heroic images), in theater (tragedy, comedy and opera), and in literature (epic, lyric and the novel). Mythology remains an attractive subject for the arts even today. For example, the figures of ancient mythologies are frequently depicted in historical landscape paintings in the 17th century by Nicolas Poussin or Claude Lorrain. The mythology of Oedipus is famous to this day.[1)] How can we explain this relevance? One answer could be that

1) *Oedipus* is also famous because it is analyzed psychologically as a kind of complex by Sigmund Freud. *Oedipus Rex* is an attractive material not only in the western world, but also in eastern world. For example, a Japanese director Yukio Ninagawa directed the play in Japanese four times in 1976, 1986, 2002 and 2004. (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2002/06/19/stage/master-of-all-but-his-destiny/#.Xl9wwqj7SUk (2020/03/04))

mythology conveys universal Ideas and eternal themes. We might then ask: can we unconditionally accept old mythologies? F. W. J. Schelling's conception of mythology makes a compelling case. In his *Philosophy of Art* (1802–1803, 1804–1805), Schelling conceptualizes his own age as "modern" and makes a comparative analysis of the mythologies of various historical periods. I will suggest that Schelling's attempt to produce a new mythology for his contemporaries could provide a mythological perspective for our own time.

This paper mainly treats Schelling's philosophy of art and especially his lectures entitled the *Philosophy of Art*, where he discusses the theory of mythology through concrete examples. First, I summarize Schelling's fundamental definition of the philosophy of art and his classification of the arts. Second, I clarify the comparative relationship between the ancient and modern world in his texts. Finally, I explore some texts by Schelling that venture beyond the binary of ancient versus modern and subsequently propose that Schelling has a diverse perspective of the non-European world. Schelling aims to overcome modernity and produce a new mythology for his own age based on the philosophy of nature.

Mythology in Schelling's Philosophy of Art: The Philosophy of Art as a kind of Philosophy

Scholars have described Schelling as a "Proteus" or "Janus"[2] because he changes philosophical positions so frequently. This description has a critical aspect insofar as it suggests that there is no coherence across Schelling's early and later periods. But Walther E. Ehrhardt has taken issue with this description. Barbara Loer sees "continuity" and insists there is "only *one* Schelling."[3] This radical change follows Horst

2) Cf. H. J. Sandkühler (Hrsg.), *F. W. J. Schelling*, Stuttgart, 1998, p. 40.
3) *Ibid*. Cf. B. Loer, *Das Absolute und die Wirklichkeit in Schellings Philosophie. Mit der*

Fuhrmans, who emphasizes the necessity of the whole oeuvre for interpreting Schelling's late philosophy. These readings posit continuity across Schelling's philosophy despite his changing philosophical systems. Today the whole picture of Schelling's philosophy is becoming clearer. For example, Xavier Tilliette has published a biography of Schelling, which spans his entire life and thought.[4] Hans Jörg Sandkühler also describes Schelling's philosophy as "a work in becoming (*ein Werk im Werden*)."[5] Schelling's philosophy of mythology occurs in both his early and late writings.

Before discussing Schelling's theory of mythology, I will introduce the motivating principles of his philosophy.

Division	System	Book, Lecture or Manuscript
Earliest		*De Malorum Origine* (1792) , *On Myths* (1793)
Early	Philosophy of Ego (1794–97)	*Of the I* (1795)
	Philosophy of Nature (1797–99)	*Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: as Introduction to the Study of this Science (Ideen)* (1797), *Of the Worldsoul (Weltseele)* (1798), *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799), *Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799)
	Idealism (1800)	*System of transcendental Idealism* (1800)
	Philosophy of Identity (1801–1807)	*Presentation of My System of Philosophy* (1801) *Lecture on the Philosophy of Art* (1802–1803, 1804–1805), *Bruno* (1802), *On the Relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature* (1807)
Middle	(1809–Late 1820s)	*Freedom essay* (1809) *The Philosophy of the Ages* (1811)
Late	Positive Philosophy (1827–1854)	*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1827) *Philosophy of Revelation* (1841–1842) *Philosophy of Mythology* (1842)

Erstedition einer Handschrift aus dem Berliner Schelling-Nachlaß. Berlin/New York, 1974, p. 146 and W. E. Ehrhardt, Nur ein Schelling. in: *Studi Urbinati*, 51, 1977, p. 111ff.

4) X. Tilliette, *Schelling: Biographie* [*Les vies des philosophes*], Paris, 1999. translated from French into German by S. Schaper, Stuttgart, 2004.

5) Sandkühler 1998, pp. 1–39.

This table periodically divides Schelling's philosophical systems and works. The philosophy of nature is most-widely known. Here Schelling regards nature as productivity and organic unity. It is in the late philosophy that mythology is discussed. Here I focus only on the philosophy of art because it explains the role that mythology plays in art.

The term "philosophy of art" has two meanings for Schelling. One is his theory of art between 1800 and 1807, whereas the other is explored in the lecture series entitled the *Philosophy of Art* given in Jena (1802–1803) and repeated in Würzburg (1804–1805). To prepare these lectures Schelling borrowed August Wilhelm Schlegel's Berlin lecture notes, otherwise known as *Die Kunstlehre* (1801).[6] Most of Schelling's work on the philosophy of art is based on the philosophy of identity. In the philosophy of identity the absolute (the unconditioned), which Kant regarded as unknowable, becomes an absolute identity. The absolute is also referred to as 'God' or 'the universe.' According to Schelling, the true, the good and the beautiful are the three Ideas of the Absolute i.e. God in different worlds (science, virtue and art). Schelling's account of the relation between the Ideas and God is influenced by Neoplatonism and especially the Emanationism of Werner Beierwaltes.[7]

In his lectures, Schelling defines the philosophy of art as follows:

> In the philosophy of art I accordingly intend to construe first of all not art *as* art, as this ***particular***, but rather *the universe in the form of art*, and the philosophy of art is *the science of the All in the form or potency (Potenz) of art*. (AAII, 6, 1, 114 / SWV 368)[8]

6) Schelling asked Schlegel to loan his note of the lectures. Letter from Schelling to A. W. Schlegel on Sep.3, 1802. (AAIII, 2, 1, 468.)

7) Beierwaltes clarifies the relation between Schelling and Neoplatonism. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Platonismus und Idealismus*, Frankfurt am Main, 1972. And he summarizes conception of Schelling's Philosophy of Art, W. Beierwaltes, Einleitung in: F. W. J. Schelling, *Texte zur Philosophie der Kunst*, Stuttgart, 2004, pp. 3–35.

Schelling claims that art can represent the Idea of beauty. Via a gifted artist, the absolute is combined with an objective thing and made into an artwork. The absolute then appears as beauty in a real, objective artwork. The philosophy of art is not just the theory of taste, for Schelling, but an account of the absolute and the universe. Philosophy and art are understood as different representations of the absolute. Schelling presents them as aspects of a dualistic worldview: "just as philosophy presents the absolute in the *archetype* (*Urbild*), so also does art present the absolute in a *reflexed image* (*Gegenbild*)" (AAII, 6, 1, 114 / SWV 369).[9] The absolute is reflected as the Idea of beauty in an artwork. Schelling restates this definition elsewhere: "The philosophy of art is the presentation of the universe in the form of art" (Ibid.). Man perceives the universe (or the absolute) as beauty through artworks.

The Classification of Art in the *Philosophy of Art*

Potency (*Potenz*) is another significant concept in Schelling's philosophical systematization of art. Potency originally means power, force, and potentiality, but in the philosophy of nature Schelling adds a mathematical meaning. "Exponentiation" is a term he borrows from the German philosopher and physician Adolph Carl August Eschenmeyer,[10]

8) AA: *Akademische Historisch-kritische Schelling-Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, SW: Schelling's *Sämmtliche Werke* edited by K. F. A. Schelling. For the citations in this article, I translate original German text by reference to the following English translation: F. W. J. Schelling, translated by D. W. Stott, *The Philosophy of Art*, University of Minnesota Press, 1989. When the original German words are spaced for emphasis, they are written in italics in the English translation. The original German words in bold are also in bold in the English translation. I underline the words that I added or modified. Here, Stott translates "*Potenz*" into "potence." The English translation, p. 16.

9) The English translation of *The Philosophy of Art*, p. 16. Stott translates the word "Gegenbild" into "reflex or reflexed image."

10) Schelling refers to the concept of potency in *First Outline of a System of the Philoso-*

who defines it as the operation of raising one quantity to the power of another (e.g. A^n). Schelling integrates exponentiation by repeating the same elements and constructions at higher stages, which he calls "*Potenzierung*." With this definition of potency Schelling characterizes each artform as a real unity, an ideal unity, or the indifference of both.

Art Genres / Unity	Ideal Line	Real Line
	Literary Arts	Plastic Arts
Indifference	Drama	Sculpture
Ideal Unity	Epic	Painting
Real Unity	Lyric	Music

Schelling arranges the arts schematically. The absolute represents the Idea in every different form and genre.

The Gods as Ideal Subject for Art

To intuit the absolute as an Idea, Schelling revives the concept of intellectual intuition, which he contrasts with sensible intuition. Intellectual intuition is the ability to intuit directly the nature of things beyond sensation. For Schelling, intellectual intuition is the ability to intuit Ideas in images. This is the process through which Ideas are combined with images. Schelling also calls this power imagination (*Einbildungkraft*) and characterizes it as follows: "The German word of "imagination" (*Einbildungskraft*) actually means the power of *mutual informing into unity* (*Ineinsbildung*) upon which all creation really is based" (AAII, 6, 1, 129 / SWV 386).[11] Schelling also calls the imagination "the power of Individuation" (Ibid.) and the power to produce an individual "the

phy of Nature (1799) at first, and he intensively argues it in *Introduction to the Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799). Juichi Matsuyama clarifies the influence from Eschenmeyer's study of nature on Schelling's philosophy of nature. J. Matsuyama, *Humans and Nature* [in Japanese], Nara, 2004, pp. 48–58.

11) The English translation of *The Philosophy of Art*, p. 32.

divine Imagination" (AAII, 6, 1, 134f. / SWV 393), that is to say, the imagination of God. Schelling's notion of imagination is not only the human faculty of cognition, as it is for Kant, but a power of divine creation.

Schelling defines the Idea as follows: "*particular things, to the extent they are absolute in that particularity, and thus to the extent they as particulars are simultaneously universes, are called* ***Ideas***" (§27, AAII, 6, 1, 132 / SWV 390).[12] For Schelling, the syntheses of the universal and particular in themselves are called "Ideas," and he defines the syntheses of the universal and the particular in the real as the gods (§28, AAII, 6, 1, 132f. / SWV 390). Schelling defines gods with two verbs: "to mean" (*bedeuten*) and "to be" (*sein*); gods do not mean or signify Ideas because they are (*sein*) Ideas themselves (§35, AAII, 6, 1, 141 / SWV 401). For example, Jupiter himself *is* the indifference of absolute power and absolute wisdom; Jupiter does not "mean" absolute power and wisdom. Schelling names this way of thinking about gods or Ideas the "symbol:"

> *Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular* ***within the particular*** *is possible only symbolically*. (§39, AAII, 6, 1, 145 / SWV 406)[13]

When the unity of the universal and the particular is given particular form, Schelling names it "symbol;" and the ideal examples are Greek gods. In addition to this definition of the symbol Schelling adds the following description: symbol is constructed by meaning (*Sinn*) and figure (*Bild*) (AAII, 6, 1, 149 / SWV 412). According to Schelling, there are three different ways to represent Ideas and three kinds of relation between universal and particular: schema, allegory, and symbol. The symbol is the absolute indifference between the universal and the particular.

12) Ibid. p. 34. Stott translates "*Ideen*" into "ideas."
13) Ibid. p. 45.

Schelling explains that in schematism "the particular is intuited through the universal" and allegory occurs when "the universal is intuited through the particular" (AAII, 6, 1, 145f. / SWV 407). Imagination is the power to unify universal and particular; it operates in three different ways.

> Although all three different modes of representation are possible only through the imagination and are forms of it, only the third constitutes the absolute. (AAII, 6, 1, 146 / SWV 407)[14)]

Schelling combines Kant's schema of the imagination in *Critique of Pure Reason* with the symbol from the *Critique of Judgement* and Goethe's allegory and symbol.[15)] Schelling thus establishes the symbol as trichotomy.

Ancient versus Modern: Gods as Symbols of Ideas

The gods as symbols of the Ideas can frequently be found in mythologies, which can also be described as poetic narratives for the gods. Schelling defines mythology as follows:

> *The entirety of the poetic renderings of the gods*, by acquiring complete objectivity or independent poetic existence, *is mythology*. (§37, AAII, 6, 1, 144 / SWV 405)[16)]

Schelling calls mythology the material (*Stoff*) of art and says "*mythology is the necessary condition and first material of all art*" (§38, AAII, 6, 1,

14) Ibid. p. 46.
15) S. Yahata, "Die Einbildungskraft in Schellings Kunstphilosophie: Uebernahme und Entwicklung des Kantinischen Schemas und Symbols [in Japanese]," *Philosophy* (*Tetsugaku*), The Philosophical Association of Japan, Vo.67, 2016, pp. 262–276.
16) The English translation, p. 45.

144 / SWV 405).[17] Ancient Greek mythology is the ideal mythology because their gods are symbols of Ideas, which is regarded as a highest achievement among every artform. Moreover, Greek mythology contains ideal and exemplary characters that are absent from modern times. Schelling arranges the differences between the ancient and modern in the following table.[18]

Ancient	Modern
Realistic	Idealistic
Exemplary	Original
Symbolic	Allegorical
Ancient Mythology	Christian Mythology
Nature	History
Physical	Spiritual
Being (Sein)	Practice
Masculine	Feminine
Genus	Species
Sublime	Beauty
Consistency	Progress in Change

Ancient Greek Mythology

Ancient Greek mythology takes nature as the central feature. That is why Ancient Greek mythology lies on the "real" side of art. According to Schelling's philosophy of identity, absolute identity in the world of art is divided into nature and spirit, real and ideal. These poles are therefore only different perspectives of the same identity. The world of art has both real and ideal sides. Schelling describes Ancient Greece as polytheistic, which means there were many different gods that embodied Ideas. Each Idea is unified into each image of a god so Schelling regards Greek gods as symbols. A symbol means neither 'to mean' nor 'to be'; it is an inseparable integration of Idea and figure. Schelling describes symbol as

17) Ibid. Stott translates "Stoff" into "content."
18) M. Titzmann, *Strukturwandel der philosophischen Ästhetik 1800–1880, Der Symbolbegriff als Paradigma*, Munich, 1978, p. 44.

the indifference between universal and particular; myth becomes the absolute as indifference of universal and particular in the particular. So in Greek myth God is symbol. For Schelling, every God in Greek mythology embodies Ideas in him or herself, which means he or she is a symbolic being. Schelling also suggests that Greek art represents the gods through "figure." One can imagine examples of Greek art or antique sculpture in which a Greek mythological god is expressed in stone or embodied in an Idea i.e. a statue of Minerva as the symbol of wisdom. In contrast to sculpture, according to Schelling, painting is harmonically constructed out of three different elements: lines and forms, light and shade, and color. In Schelling's classification, painting is dominant among the modern plastic arts.

Gods are not only represented in the plastic arts. In the literary arts, Schelling considers Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to be folk works. Significant as they are, Schelling does not classify the Greek epics through indifference but rather as an ideal unity. For Schelling, the prevailing genre in the literary arts is drama and tragedy in particular. Furthermore, Schelling says that tragedy is a characteristic genre of the Greeks. That is because Greek tragedy can represent the indifference between the universal and the particular through the heroic image. For example, Oedipus becomes a symbol of the Idea beyond contradiction: destiny (necessity) and freedom through his final decisive action.[19] In this way, Greek tragedy represents indifference between the real and ideal as symbolic.

19) Yahata argues the significance of ancient Greek tragedy for the modern age by analyzing Sophocles's *Oedipus Rex* and Schelling's interpretation of it in the philosophy of art. S. Yahata, *The Idea of Imagination in the Philosophy of Art by Schelling* [in Japanese], Kyoto, 2017, pp. 146–164. And S. Yahata "Anerkennung der menschlichen Freiheit in Schellings Auslegung des Ödipus in seiner Tragödientheorie: Die Entwicklung von *Philosophischen Briefen über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus* zur *Philosophie der Kunst*" [in Japanese], *Aesthetics,* 2016, vol. 67 (1), pp. 23–36.

Christianity in the Modern Age

The modern age contrasts with the ancient in many respects; one of the clearest examples is Christianity. For Schelling, ideal spirit becomes more dominant in the modern age. In contrast with pluralistic gods in ancient polytheism, Christ or Maria is a single person as a symbolic being in Christianity. Christ (or Maria) reveals the miracle through practices like transfiguration. In Christianity, history is generally elevated over nature. Compared to the symbol in the ancient world, the concept of allegory (which has a direction from the particular to the universal) is a dominant element in the modern world. Thus art in the modern period is characterized as harmonious or composed of various elements. In the case of visual art, one thinks of some Christian paintings by famous painters in modern times (Leonardo da Vinci, Correggio (Antonio Allegri), Tiziano Vecellio and Rafaello Santi). For example, *The Sistine Madonna* (1512/13) and *The Transfiguration* (1516–1520) by Raffaello. For example, Individuality is paramount in the modern, for Schelling, and the originality of the artist is emphasized as genius especially in the fields of painting and literature.[20)]

Problem of Modernity in Romanticism against Classicism or Neoclassicism

Early Romanticism greatly influenced Schelling's knowledge of art around 1800. At that time Schelling deepened his friendship with early Romantic thinkers and artists. In 1798, Schelling visited Dresden and had a contact with them August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel, Caroline Schlegel and Novalis among others.[21)] Schelling sometimes vis-

20) Schelling regards Guido Reni as highly as Raffaello in *On the Relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature* (1807). Cf. SWVII 320f.

21) Yahata argues the application from Schelling's experience of artworks to his analysis

ited the Dresden picture gallery with them. After this visit, Schelling started to think seriously about art in his *System of transcendental Philosophy* (1800) and *The Philosophy of Art* (1802–1803, 1804–1805). This makes clear the deep connection between Schelling and Romanticism. Romanticism is conventionally opposed to Classicism and Neoclassicism. I will now sketch the key traits of each period from the perspective of aesthetics. Classicism began from the Renaissance and continued until the 18th century. It valued reason, Enlightenment, general beauty and common sense. The classical style is generally associated with the unification of life, harmony, restraint, and adherence to recognized standards of form and craftsmanship. It adheres to ancient styles in Greece or Rome. Neoclassicism subsequently appeared in Europe from the 18th century to the early 19th century. In this period, archaeological discovery provided new information about antiquity. The main goal of Neoclassicism was to imitate the arts in Ancient Greece and Rome. A representative example is J. J. Winckelmann's influential *Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture* (1756) and *The History of Art in Antiquity* (1764).

Romanticism emerged in the late 18th century as a reaction against Classicism and Neoclassicism. Romanticism emphasizes inspiration, subjectivity, and the primacy of the individual. However, it is not easy to clearly define Romanticism because of its paradoxical features.[22)] Romanticism has been recognized for its praise of the middle ages, reformism, the elevation of emotion, spirituality, morbidity, the experience of nature, the appeal to organic nature, infinity, contradiction, intuition,

---

of them in *The Philosophy of Art*. Yahata, 2017, pp. 109–134. Arne Zerbst demonstrates the relation between Schelling's philosophy of art and his concrete knowledges of artworks from the perspective of art history. A. Zerbst, *Schelling und die bildende Kunst: Zum Verhältnis von kunstphilosophischem System und konkreter Werkkenntnis*, Munich, 2011.

22) Cf. Tieck & Wackenroder, *Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar*, 1797. Schlegel Brothers, *Athenaeum*, 1798–1800.

mysticism, genius, and antiquity. The problems of the modern are evident in these contradictory terms. From the perspective of the modern, Ancient Greece is the unity of life and the mythological world, whereas the modern is characterized by the fragmentation of life, identity and society.

New Mythology: Which mythology is sought in the modern?

A) Particular Mythology created by Poet

It is impossible to return to antiquity because there is no longer any universal symbol. In Homer's epics the stories and history of the Greeks are transmitted orally, whereas artworks in modern times are created by individual artists. The moderns seek a new mythology for their own era. It can be neither ancient Greek myth nor modern Christianity. Finding this new mythology is the goal of Schelling's early works like *The Oldest System-Program* (1795–1796) and *System of transcendental Idealism* (1800).

Although Schelling does not define what a new mythology should be, I will try to sketch one possibility from the *Philosophy of Art*. Schelling begins by considering creative artists as "greatest individuals of modern world" (AAII, 6, 1, 178/, SWV 445). For Schelling, the fundamental rule of modern poem is "originality" (Ibid.), and each true creative individual has to produce his own mythology and characters. For example, Ugolino in Dante's *La Divina Commedia* (early 14c), Falstaff in William Shakespeare's *Henry IV* (1596–1598), Lear in *King Lear* (1605), Macbeth in *Macbeth* (1606), Don Quijote and Sancho Panza in Cervantes's *Don Quijote* (1605), and Faust in Goethe's *Faust* (1808, 1833).

> This being the case, we can assert that until that time in the yet undetermined and distant future when the world spirit (*Welt-*

> *geist*) itself has completed the great poem upon which it now reflects, and when the succession of the modern world has transformed itself into a ***simultaneity*** (***Zumal***) — until that point, every great poet is called to structure from this evolving (mythological) world, a world of which his *own age* can reveal to him only a part. I repeat: from this world he is to structure into a whole that particular part revealed to him, and to create from the material (*Stoff*) of that world *his* mythology. (AAII, 6, 1, 177f. / SWV 445)[23]

Schelling maintains that genius poets create their own mythologies in the modern period. Under the influence of Kant, Schelling characterizes "genius" as the ability to find "aesthetic Ideas" and techniques to produce artworks. The genius is "the obscure concept" (*der dunkle Begriff*) that supplies objectivity (AAI, 9, 1, 316 / SWIII 616). Schelling divides the activity of the genius into two parts; unconscious and conscious. The former is called 'poesy' (*Poesie*) and the latter 'technique' (*Kunst*). The former is a native ability that cannot be learned, whereas the latter is learnable. Talented artists can produce works with both faculties and only they can relate to the world spirit. Schelling does not accept only German poems but the mythologies of every age. A few talented poets can create their own mythologies and form a part of the whole of human history. So one possible mythology in the modern period is an individual mythology.

23) The English translation, p. 74. I add some original German words to this citation: "*Weltgeist*," "*zumal*" and "*Stoff*." In the last sentence, Stott translates "and to create from the content and substance of that world *his* mythology." I changed the words "content and substance" into "material."

B) Perspectives on diverse myths

Schelling does not say that Christianity alone meets the condition of universal mythology. This condition is the power to unite different mythological worlds as a revelation of the universal world spirit. There are many mythological worlds. Schelling describes this as follows:

> what *simultaneous* multiplicity of customs and cultures — among individual nations and humanity as a whole — and what *sequential* variety within the various centuries, if one considers that modern poesy is no longer a poesy merely for one particular people that has developed into a collective whole, but rather must be the poesy for the entire species and be generated out of the material of the entire history of this species with all its multifarious colors and tones. (AAII, 6, 1, 175 / SWV 442)[24)]

It is clear that Schelling recognizes multiple customs and cultures in the modern period, which implies that he holds a pluralistic view of religion and culture. Schelling does not display German absolutism and centralism. To be sure, Schelling regards Christianity as a part of the universal spirit but Christianity is not seen as the absolute religion or mythology in the modern age. Every historical poesy is included in the entire history of humanity.

> If one considers all these circumstances together one will have no doubt that the mythology of Christianity, too, in the thoughts of the world spirit, is always merely a part of the larger whole this spirit doubtlessly is preparing. (Ibid.)[25)]

24) The English translation, p. 72.
25) Ibid.

Schelling further clarifies the inclusive relationship.

> We can see from this that it [Christianity] will first be within the larger whole, of which it is then a part, that Christianity can function again as universally valid poetic material. (AAII, 6, 1, 176 / SWV 443)[26)]

From Schelling's perspective, Christianity will become the past in a larger project of the spirit of the world. Christianity is merely part of the whole. In this thought Schelling's earlier philosophy of nature can be detected.

In his early philosophy of nature, Schelling rejects the mechanistic view of nature, according to which natural beings are represented as machines that interact causally. According to this view, all appearances of nature must be explained without recourse to spirit or soul. Schelling reiterates this connection to nature in the philosophy of art. The problem of relation of spirit to nature is one of the central issues of his philosophy from the early period. He briefly states the close link between nature and spirit in his work *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: as Introduction to the Study of this Science (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur)* (1797). Schelling demands in the introduction to the work that "nature should be visible spirit; spirit should be invisible nature" (AAI, 5, 107 / SWII 56). This indicates that Schelling not only finds a close connection between nature and spirit but also considers nature to be the history of spirit.

The above citation recalls the notion of 'world soul' (*Weltseele*) developed in *On the World Soul* (1798). Here Schelling tries to under-

26) Ibid. Stott translates this sentences "We can see from this that it will only be within the larger whole..." I add the word "[Christianity] which "it" means. In the same sentence, Stott translates the German word "erst" into "only," but I change it into "first."

stand how nature as a whole developed organically. The world soul is originally an ancient Greek idea of nature or universe. Schelling borrows it in order to understand nature as the universal organism.

Schelling's fundamental conception of the connection between nature and humanity is repeated in a lecture from the philosophy of art entitled *On the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature* in 1807. Schelling here considers the productivity of nature as a spring that artists should imitate when producing artworks. Schelling calls this the 'nature-spirit' (*Naturgeist*). He integrates it into the deep connection of spirit and nature in art.

C) Renewal of the connection to nature

Schelling seeks a new mythology that will reintegrate nature into the modern age. He says "the possibility of a future mythology and symbolism might be found in higher speculative physics" (AAII, 6, 1, 181 / SWV 449). Schelling foresees the possibility in a new philosophy of nature called speculative physics. In order to accomplish this, Schelling refers to beliefs in secret powers of nature, which he locates in the East:

> In the Orient people generally accepted the existence of mysterious forces in stones and plants. This belief, like the art of medicine, came to Europe with the Arabs. This applies equally to the use of the talisman and amulets, with which people in the Orient have protected themselves since the earliest times against poisonous snakes and evil spirits. Many of the mythological views of the animal world were not unique to modernity. (AAII, 6, 1, 182 / SWV 451)[27)]

27) The English translation, p. 78.

Schelling regards the acceptance of a mysterious force of nature as a unique characteristic of the East. The subject of the force of nature interests Schelling from his early years. From Schelling's perspective, the modern period has some complicated problems to overcome: for example, the modern world is fragmented or divided society because of individualism and it has a tendency to emphasize ideal, subjective, and historical perspectives. Schelling thinks that we should reestablish the connection to nature and suggests that Eastern beliefs may provide a resource. The lines above suggest that Schelling's philosophy can accommodate an Eastern perspective and the non-European world in general. In this way, Schelling hopes to create a new mythology to supersede the modern world – but the universal mythology must remain a task for the future. In the same period the non-European world also intrigued philosophers like Johann Gottfried von Herder, August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel, and Arthur Schopenhauer.[28)]

Conclusion: the meaning of mythology for us

For Schelling, mythology is a critique of modern times, which is to say, his contemporary world. It is not so easy to compare our postmodern age with Schelling's. Today's society is more complicated and diverse as a result of the information society and technological change. One is more aware than ever of the different nations, regions, and cultures. However, it is still possible to recognize the relevance of Schelling's desire for a new mythology. It could provide a useful critique of modernity and the hope

28) Cf. K. Kasahara, *The German Enlightenment and the Non-European World: Knigge, Lessing and Herder* [in Japanese], Tokyo, 2017. Schelling's theory of mythology is also elaborated later in his positive philosophy. In the history of Japanese philosophy we can find a link to his theory of mythology. For example, Takashi Hashimoto indicates the connection between Shuzo Kuki and Schelling, by taking the notion of 'contingency' up. Cf. T. Hashimoto, *Contingency and Mythology* [in Japanese], Tokai University Press, 1998.

for a better future.

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17K 13314.

3

The Most Important Event in Life:

Hu Shi and Theatrical Modernity in Early Republican China

John Zou

In March 1919, Hu Shi published *The Most Important Event in Life*, a small play in *Peking Leader*, a negligible local English-language journal but, reissued in Chinese two months later, it took the country by storm. The play was about a young woman in love, baffled by the parents' unreasonable caution, makes off with the young man who claims her attention. Though a good few years interceded between its appearance in the boisterous *Xin qingnian* (New Youth) and first stage production, it attracted dozens of quick imitations in print and begot for them the designation of "Nora plays," for *Zhongshen dashi* openly borrowed from Ibsen's *Et dukkehjem* (A Doll's House, particularly Nora, at her defiant quitting of the house of prescribed identities. Some then claimed that the work launched China's discourse on cultural modernity. The rest was history.

The excitement of this work, despite changeable reading paradigms in China of the past century, may be quite accessible even at a distance, for example by Susan Leigh Foster's vocabulary of written and writing bodies.[1] Of the four main characters, Chen, the male lover, may engage readers and audience as a writing body, since he creates his modern,

independent young woman by a note delivered to her, something of a fiat. But since he never walks on stage, the character obviously refuses to disclose how his own body is composed by another source. He is, to a degree, written and unwritten as a stage presence. Yamei, the young woman, on the contrary demonstrates with intensity both passive and active processes of bodily inscriptions, as she takes over Chen's message and transforms herself and the nature of her relation with parents, tradition, home, etc., and cuts an unprecedented figure for the Chinese society at large. She forms an exact opposite also of her father, who takes over established codes and works to regulate his household on their terms, and fails. The mother, of course, defaults as code, an embodiment of brittle exertion and pretended persuasiveness even to herself.

Between Chen, product by a mystified, withdrawn hand, and Mrs. Tian, inert insistence vainly launched for transcription, Hu Shi's imagined stage unfolds a contested field of writing by off-shore western values and discredited Chinese traditions, a space of unresolved and unresolvable suspension, upon which the blueprint of Chinese modernity is projected. These are holy, transparent figures by Richard Schechner's classic description, each communicating an ecstatic self-reduction, his to the point of self-erasure, hers by a dogmatic form of ceaseless repetition. Next to them stand the "doubles," father and daughter, bound by the task of bearing another body (western or masculine) upon his Chinese and her female own, thus suggesting aggravated anxiety over choice and a stake in the real.[2] But should Mr. Tian default to a meshing of cosmopolitan and indigenous orientations (his parlor is decorated by both western landscape painting and Chinese scrolls of mountains and mist), Yamei turns in a space of crisis, a point where the cosmopolitan

1) Susan Leigh Forster, "An Introduction to Moving Bodies," in *Choreographing History,* Susan Leigh Forster, ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995).
2) Richard Schechner, *Performace Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 197.

and indigenous lose touch, where she embodies the neither-nor, the out-of-space, the limit of bodily inscriptions.

> A pivotal moment thus arrives on her receipt of a note from the paramour:
>
> TIAN YAMEI (*looking up and seeing LI MA*): Is Mr. Chen still waiting in his car?
> LI MA: Yes. Here is a note he wrote for you. (*She produces a sheet of paper and passes it to TIAN YAMEI*)
> TIAN YAMEI: (*reading*) "This matter concerns *women liangren* (the two of us) and no one else. *Ni gai ziji jueduan* (You should decide by yourself)." (*Repeating the final sentence*) "*Ni gai* (you should) decide by yourself." Yes. *Wo gai* (I should) decide by myself ... (*TIAN YAMEI stands, puts on her overcoat, hastily jots down a note at the writing desk, and places it underneath the flower vase on the table. With one look back, she hurries out the door to the right ...*)[3)]

Tension is not just registered in the physical *contraposto,* a pause that disorientates left stage and right, choreographing the intersection of backwardness and forwardness, home and adventure, the splintered "now." This position where Joseph Roach discovers that "the performer turns in different directions simultaneously at the knees, the hips, the shoulders, and the head, making an interesting line of the body" also mediates the radicality in her identity informed by a disagreement to break parent from lover, one aspects of herself from another, tradition from its enemy.[4)] Of her filial protest, "*zheshi hai'erde zhongshendashi,*

3) Hu Shi, "The Main Event in Life," trans., Edward Gunn, in *The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Drama*, ed., Xiaomei Chen (New York: Columbia Press, 2010), 64-65. Hereafter *CAMCD*.

hai'er yinggai ziji jueduan (This is the most important event in your child's life, she should decide by herself)," whereas the modernist phrase "*ziji jueduan* (decide by herself)" is derived from the paramour's motivational memorandum, an antiquated axiom "*zhongshen dashi* (the most important event in life)" continues the mother's persistent, transgenerational unreason. At several earlier points, Mrs. Tian is heard to pronounce: "You must understand: *zheshi nide zhongshen dashi* (this is the most important event in your life). And you are my only child. I can't just muddle-headedly let you marry a man with whom you're not compatible." etc., etc.[5)]

The bodily suspense of the young woman in love thus takes place between home and maternal influence on the one hand, and a masculine beyond on the other. Metaphorically it also stands out for painful temporal registration. Poised between past and future, she for a moment of remarkable transience, points to the breakdown in historical continuity and speciousness of the Jamesian "now" to which she gives experiential substance. The turn toward an off-stage lover, a generic articulation of desire, coupled with another to the present but apparently neglected mother, acquires poignancy when she finds herself in a representational tug-of-war. The unresolved positionality of her *contraposto* makes up precisely what Roach describes as the staging of "extraordinary attraction." As someone of "suddenly reversible polarities," the young woman hereby mediates "the simultaneous experience of mutually exclusive possibilities — truth and illusion, presence and absence, face and mask," a precarious center of "at once self-expression and self-erasure," a center that "cannot hold," but in the process of performance "generates an intense, charismatic radiance that emanates" from a fissionable source.[6)]

---

4) Joseph Roach, *IT* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 8.
5) Chen, 59.
6) Roach, 9

Splintered Now

Tian Yamei, projected for a fictional "now," where separate historical momentums clash, is no doubt lost in romantic reverie and heterosexual intimacy, but then she also performs, almost unconsciously, the daughterly inclination toward maternal custom. She "decides" as per Chen's aggression, or the male lover's forwardness, but "repeats" no less than in the fashion of her mother, the aging woman's obstinate death instinct and embrace of inert past. But the two voices that condition her staged split somehow coincide to provide a compelling source for her self-justification. As she tears between this world and the other, a part of her seemed joined to either destination, and yet she remains an integrated subject of androgyny. Her semi-autonomous decision, i.e., the masculine announcement that "she should decide by herself," is conditionally framed by her maternal reference "this is your daughter's most important event in life," where specifically, the declarative "she" is preceded by a supplicant "your daughter," and the performative "decide" by the constative "is." Informing her historical disorientation is thus not merely a belated modernism, generically mimetic and continuously formative. There is also an uncertainty in terms of gender, by which androgynous subject denotes no mere overlapping of the masculine future and feminine past, but two contending voices and identities brought together via forced integration by syntax, an articulation on the very edge of gendered void, of the non-existent identity of neither modernist man nor traditional woman, or of their reciprocal annulment by ideological renunciation.

And there is more to Yamei's precarious selfhood. Insofar as she mimics Chen, she is also bent on masculine withdrawal and self-cancelation. A precarious May Fourth modernism mediated in the play reveals that the new woman nearly returns masculinity to male safekeeping, insofar as she gravitates toward the void of her own symbolic erasure, And it is by such erasure that she coincides with Chen, that

their bond acquires camaraderie and formal validity. But the romantic enterprise in the play featuring the lovers' performance of canceling themselves together at her quitting of the house is misleading, since the erotic dynamic does not simply imply a voluntary termination of that nascent bond in the same process as it is being made. In Hu Shi's seminal work, their radical togetherness is prototypically at once underscored and circumvented, given that the two instances of self-cancellation are sequential. The masculinity of woman works as May Fourth man's cleansed slate and extended lease on life, where his banished gender profile receives indirect, neo-masculine, redemption under a transitory female stewardship speciously terminated on her imitative concession. The Noraesque woman is a spectral character who is categorically without essence in her own story, as she is always a step behind him, not only by the fact of her ties within tradition, in which he does not partake, but also because of her mimetic constitution. Her bond with him is by default fractured, incomplete, characterized by touch and tear, union and separation, euphoria and anxiety, manifest identification and dormant recalcitrance. Furthermore, to her absent modernist agitator, the Noraesque woman is not Nora, an intimate and yet ruinous stranger over whom the paternal man has lost control. On the contrary, she is a figure of Chen's active dispensation and prosthetic front. Performing his catharsis, she not only reincarnates masculinity as loss, but also reconstitutes that very masculinity that he unloads from himself, the persona he removed from his person and designated for secondary use, transferred to a different body to be desired by himself, and reconcilable with him when reconstitution is complete.

For that matter, her masculine denial of the maternal past is by no means conclusive. If Nora's departure announces her categorical disentanglement from her former self, what Yamei initiates is a combination of severance and attachment, a form of "tearing," in which a part of her is indisputably joined to the mother. When Chen's injunction passes through her varying revisions, the subject of the sentence changes

significantly from the imperative *ni* (you) to the declarative *wo* (I), and then to the supplicant *hai'er* (your child), as per custom of the day, when it is finally addressed to the parents. The advocacy for modernity is made in its two-way split. Even as she steps out, she still reminds her parents of her remnant devotion to them, of her sentimentally being their child. Nora reverses Torvald's words and action against him, she has arrived out of her old provincial singularity. As Yamei turns to the bracketed off "beyond" on the stage, she turns not as a singular person but as a pluralized entity. Her modernist individuality, first introduced via *women liangren* (the two of us) in Chen's original proposal, is now further complicated in her parting statement phrased in connectivity with traditional value. Her turn, in other words, is informed by bilateral contentions with a self-canceling void at the core of her identity that threatens her undoing. And the fact that she remains, for however brief a time as the play lasts, a cogent subject or syntactic master of speech is made possible very much by the contradicting support of maternal insistence. Yamei's voicing in one breath the modernist "your child should decide by myself" and the traditional "[t]his is the most important event in your child's life" registers with force an antithetical balance against the lover with whom she is to elope. The void between future and past, intensified by masculine self-erasure, is hereby strangely but opportunely filled, i.e., written over, by Mrs. Tian's unreason and repetition quickened to life by challenge of the modern. The quasi-epic battle of codes between modernity and tradition, i. e., the absolute uncertainty in the real that at every moment is about to get out of hand, becomes inscribed back into the symbolic by an aging woman's wordiness. The very importance tradition attributes to the marital bond and the larger social institution implied therein provides a wordy and worldly framework, from which the modernist subject performing self-erasure is not allowed to withdraw. And at this point, the splintered now is torn not only by the past and future, the masculine and feminine, but also by the dormant and manifest.

In *Zhongshen dashi,* the temporal "present" as given flesh and blood by Yamei is virtually deflected from two different modes of love, equally overreaching in their obscene neediness, of her one-dimensional futurist idea of a paramour and comically flat relic of a historical mother, separate temporalities intertwined in a strangely contentious mutual support. To the extent that Ibsen's Nora, an indifferent European stranger, acquires a Chinese stand-in in Hu Shi's play through a short-handed modernist romance with intense erotic interest, distant cosmopolitanism becomes as relevant, even responsive, to China's modernizing disorientation as the clingy tradition embodied through repeated, inhibiting nonsense. Against the Darwinian vision of evolutionary progress that met with passionate approval among May Fourth modernists such as Hu Shi himself, I hereby offer a scenario, which receives expression in a play, where Hu Si is arguably beside his prosaic and pragmatist self, and abolishes the chain-like, concatenated events as a temporal metaphor. There is no doubt that Yamei is possessed by a passion for persisting in her forward-moving, future-oriented track, for staying true to her manifest inspiration, for experiencing punctuated delays of an elated follower. Real future, in the sense of a radical alternative, is formally blotted out from the pilgrim's progress, or what Andrew Jones calls the "developmental scheme," whereby the Noraesque moment arrives at the strangely familiar landmarks along the path of exit left by that disappearing figure of cosmopolitan modernity framed as China's future, a default historical horizon upheld jointly by Chen's and Nora's absences. Meanwhile, it may be observed with equal validity that the play's novel modernism subsists not in the overcoming of the tradition's resistance, but in partially tallying with it. Such attachment to belatedness does not dictate a metaphorical deferment of future, for time ceases in the now, to which all temporal momentum is essentially directed. The very chronological belatedness of Yamei, who comes around forty years after Nora, informs a discriminatory obsession with established cosmopolitan horizon as the absolute point of departure for Chinese modernity, i.e., as time-zero of

its temporal imagination. At the bottom of the Hu Shi's dramatic discourse, there is then a persistent and problematic streak of conservatism chained not to a specific indigenous tradition but to a global *status quo* of geocultural hegemony, by subscription to which the very inability to disengage the cosmopolitan now is underwritten. The unreason of maternal repetition thus bespeaks, beyond the specific confines of the May Fourth situation, a penetrating truth of the play's geocultural condition, insofar as it illustrates with unforgiving lucidity the mighty conservative undertow against which the fable of Chinese modernism is perilously advanced. In the end, the lagging modernist, under her spell of obstinate death instinct, has to emerge from her trance-like position of androgyny to address the third dimension of her split, her sober spectrality of the manifest-dormant.

To the extent that tradition figured through a superstitious mother may be dismissed, at least superficially, as unwanted past, what is prescribed as China's future turns out to be something akin to the cosmopolitan, or indeed western, "now." In the play, such as present occupies not only, as generically conceived, a specious spot between past and future, but also a virtual one, by which the cosmopolitan "now" remains, as per China's semicolonial condition, persistently off-shore, and more consequentially, a strategic position to keep the authentically radical future from being fathomed within the Chinese context by categorically demanding its delay. A "moving ratio," as Paul Rabinow ruminates in his anthropology of science, designates a coincidence by which "the older and newer elements are given form and work together, either well or poor."[7] Hu Shi's modernist myth seems to be that once Yamei breaks away from the parental house, she would have no choice but land in the Noraesque mirage, even though what ultimately communicates her modernism is precisely her occupation of the tenuous opening de-

7) Paul Rabinow, *Marking Time: On the Anthropology of the Contemporary* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3.

fined against that idealized position. As if to eliminate the prospect of her being once and for all carried away by futurist promises, the force of the lover's call is counterbalanced by the mother's equally subsuming transmission of a piece of inherited injunction. But what goes without the male caller's saying is that the call has already been inhibited in itself. Or indeed the call is no other than the ideological and geocultural inhibition par excellence. As the curtain drops, we do not see the blissful beyond. The play only ceases with a decentered figure in the present: the true Noraesque now is poised at the brink of the present's precipice.

As the figural conservatism of maternal insistence bleeds into the cosmopolitan future and its equivalent, the geocultural "now," the play's celebration of cultural radicalism and its staging of what amounts to be radically different and new must receive scrutiny from a somewhat altered perspective. As has been said, the daughter's parting pronouncement is made in a manner in which autonomy is framed by authorization: although she refuses to submit to parental will, citation of the lover's voice is made meaningful only in recognition of the implicit wisdom of maternal counsel. In submitting to the lover's call, she heeds a vocal intervention from the beyond, but only when the very cause for her attention to such a beyond is framed by a voice of the past that somehow still rules in the here and now. Likewise, in the cosmopolitan context of transhistorical mimesis, the masculine persona of Yamei resonates with particular force with Nora's criminal act in her first masculine transformation. The contempt of law implied therein may appear quite lively if we realize that as late as 1926, the *Minguo minfa cao'an* (Draft of Civil Law of the Republic of China) still stipulates, in Article 1005, that "marriage ... must take place with the permission of parents. When parents are deceased or factually cannot deliver opinions, permission must be secured from grandparents. But those who are above age 30 are exempted from this."[8] Taking over Mr. Chen words and following them through in action, she incurs no less controversy than Nora's pilferage of the father's name. Parallel to the latter's obtaining a

bank loan without legal guarantee, her excited usurpation of rights the law recognizes as the parents' communicates passions of a distinctly anarchic kind. But the Chinese woman's masculine turn to her Scandinavian ideal is incomplete, given that the second transformation whereby Ibsen escalates Nora's transgression does not take place in *Zhongshen dashi*.

Chen's proposal, "This matter concerns the two of us and no one else. You should decide by yourself," for its passionately romantic illogic, is compromised in regulative force when placed next to Helmer's "[f]irst and foremost you are a wife and a mother." If the imperative in the second half of Chen's words is meant to lay claim on individual free will and personal self-determination, the entirety of his message suggests otherwise. In the same utterance that he asks Yamei to make her decision, he defaults on his. In its evocation of a moral bond, he spells out a norm from which he is exempted, when an affair of two is expected to be decided by one. In *Et dukkehjem*, a domestic crisis is set off when the normative strength of the husband's personal example, i.e., an unyielding regard for his honor, undercuts his encouragement of Nora's wifely submission when it is emulated in good faith, so much so that as she rises to defend hers, she is ready to tear the family apart. In *Zhongshen dashi,* by self-cancellation and yielding to Yamei the power of decision regarding their future bliss, what Chen offers is a proposal that defies emulation, since the normative dimension *qua* masculine self-centeredness is quizzically absent. To the extent that *Et dukkehjem* presents a scenario in which Nora adopts for herself an identity customarily reserved for men, the situation we encounter in *Zhongshen dashi* is one in which Yamei is at once facilitated and blocked in her quest for the masculine persona, provided that Chen's voice and action carry a masculinity in self-erasure.

8) 杨立新点校,《大清民律草案, 民国民律草案》(长春: 吉林人民出版社, 2002), 349.

What characterizes the Chinese modern, or the radically new, in the discourse of this play is then less her hitting the modernist target, the cosmopolitan "now," than missing it. What remains in force of Chen's masculine persuasion is the demonstration of his very enactment of self-erasure, as if to advocate her duplication of the same. Whereas the moral worth of Torvald's self-possession is complicated first by his private indifference to Nora and then more critically by Nora's reciprocal and extrended assumption of such indifference, what Chen offers is worse than inconsistency. It takes away the positive measure of masculinity and thus Yamei's prospect of "landing" in a masculine and implicitly Noraesque profile, and instead launches a convoluted speech act that fundamentally problematizes the woman's transformative, masculinizing process. But even if we disregard the first part of his utterance as erased in her citations, its second half, "you should decide by yourself," also appears performatively garbled. Whereas Nora is her own woman to take over father's name and husband's self-regard, Yamei's autonomy is but untenable fiction as long as she does another's bidding. Rejecting parental authority, she only voices the male lover's agenda that does not so much give separate voice as cover up her lack in independent resources and her strategically cornered self. In such wordlessness, what may superficially come across as an expressive Chinese woman appears even less so than the hidden male modernist, probably a stand-in for Hu Shi himself, whose verbal presence has to be conveyed through intermediaries.

Unless, of course, the bond thus evoked is understood to be one of love, i.e., of his romantic submission and her expected return of the same. As he cancels himself, he makes an affective move to bring about the lovers' mutual discovery. He speaks for one, but as two. The word *gai,* comparable to the Norwegian *skal*, suggests not only that subjunctive that vindicates social norms, but also some indication of future tense looking forward to the consummation of their unison. In projected reciprocity, she is to submit herself back to him, to honor his words as if they were command. His humility is to be amply rewarded. Inasmuch as

Torvald is indexed to Nora's inauthentic past, to her forgetfulness of herself, from which she then turns, Chen unveils Yamei's salvaging future, to which and with which she turns away from her mundane, self-forgetting existence under parental hold and, by metaphorical extrapolation, China's unending past. But like the self-defeating moral injunction, love also falls short in the play. With Chen's act of disappearance, *Zhongshen dashi* no doubt implements a different dynamic between man and woman than *Et dukkehjem,* its master text. When Yamei takes on the masculine persona, Chen, a man given up on fending for his masculinity, has already taken it off. He is always a step before her, a supra-Noraesque figure based on whose course of action her Noraesque leap is charted. Given that he requires self-representation be an essential trait of the modern woman, he also demonstrates self-renunciation as paramount characteristic of the enlightened modern man. Very appropriately then, he makes no physical appearance. As sonic lead, he arrives from the other side of representation's categorical divide to tear her away from where she is, from herself, to reduce her to a set of repetitions, as nonsensical in form if not content, as the mother's. Yet his concessional gesture of courtship is not reciprocated in kind. By Jacobson's *phatic* use of language, it may be expected that in such a mode of amorous discourse, his yield of decision to her is only to induce a state in which she enthuses to replicate the same yielding gesture. Yet to bring the play to a close, she takes his words at their surface value and does make or substantiate the decision which in his offer is emptied of executive force.

In the splintered "now," characters do not speak to each other. Miscommunication rules between mother and daughter, father and daughter, father and mother, but most significantly between daughter and her lover. His voice is conveyed from the beyond, an inferred place in which Yamei is yet to arrive, though for her separation from the parental hold she depends on a deflection of this voice, which speaks as much the de-masculinized man as masculinized woman, as masculinity in transition, to be determined. Between a momentous theatrical work

such as *Zhongshen dashi* and modern Chinese history, interpretive connections have always been made, and it is tempting to recognize in the aesthetic of loss by which Chen erases himself a discourse of modernist desire especially regarding Chinese masculinity mired in any number of crises from colonial onslaught to Confucian decay at the turn of the twentieth century. Extending from his proto-feminist agenda, there is always an implicit celebration of the Chinese man's modernist comeback despite his sorry track record in recent history. Chen's not setting foot into that parental house testifies to his categorical alterity from traditional fatherhood, his modernist resexualization via romantic absence. The problem of course is that the absent only teases out a political rather than romantic response, which reduces his comeback, be it moral or sexual, to a wishful enterprise. The fragmentation in Yamei's presence, as recaptured in the amorous bond between lovers, evinces a persistent crisis of the Chinese modern, where the constitutive void ironically represents an opening for the new.

The Noraesuqe Leap

To arrive at a circumspect understanding that does justice to Yamei's *contrapposto*, the other element yet to be looked at closely, or theatrically and theoretically, is the role of the father. To the extent that by Forster's terms, Chen as a composing figure remains off-stage, Mr. Tian's discursive inscription is presented in Hu Shi's play as the father's house, as the stage itself. And it has to be said that upon this stage the mother occupies an increasingly marginalized position, easily to be written off in a symmetrical design where her vision of society equals Chen's in radicality, albeit with an opposite preference, that is, if not for Yamei's resuscitation of maternal relevance in her rebellious pronouncement. Yet if the mother's repetition keeps Yamei's desire for the beyond rooted in a Chinese context, it is the father's composition of the stage that provides a backdrop against which the daughter's radical turn acquires dramatic

significance, as the father's space, where the east meets the west, implodes upon her tear and turn in-between.

A stripped-down, early Republican duplication of the snug middle class establishment of Ibsenian Scandinavia, Hu's spatial deployment retains the overall left-right balance in *Et dukkehjem*, but leaves out the comforting spatial complication created by the window, piano, footlights, the additional door, China cabinet, fire in the stove, bookcase, and carpet on the floor, etc. At obvious remove from Ibsenian metaphors of absorbing domestic freedom from care, the family parlor at the Tian residence is much emptier and the emphasis on symmetry is only intensified. The larger objects are still grouped by the central axis that divides the left from right, but the quality of texture and the "creases" in the space by which oppositions are moderated in the earlier work are replaced by a simple flip-over, armchair for armchair, door for door. The wall hangings, i.e., scrolls and painting to replace Ibsenian engravings, may indeed be affixed on one side or both, and yet the Chinese scrolls offer little more than a note of contrast to Dutch canvas. The house is distinctly unhomelike given its forced togetherness, from which the modern woman's exodus seems all but predestined. Between items of furniture and wall decoration, there is but little to settle the allegorized tendencies for conflict. And without foreseeable resolution, the parental house is no more than ground for the niggling tug-of-war between the clashing times, values, histories, as captured by the mother's impractical nonsense and Chen's "off-shore" summons, a scenario quite akin to what Peter Brooks identified as the "structure of the Manichean" in European melodrama.[9] The flat characters have no use for personal change or psychological depth, as long as they take part as human stage props locked in expressions of painful division, awaiting the inauthentic solution by the curtain. Even the "round" characters but embody the angst

9) Peter Brooks, *The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

of uncertainty articulated thereby.

As Hu Shi makes a point to exploit the signifying device of *mise-en-scène*, whose versatile service in constituting modern drama's psychic settings only begins to be appreciated in early Republican China, *Zhongshen dashi* begins with stage instructions under the direct influence of *Et dukkehjem*:

> The *huike shi* (living room) of the Tian house. There is a door on the left leading to the front door, and a door to the right leading to the dining room. Upstage is a sofa, flanked by two armchairs. At center stage there is a small round table with a flower vase on it, flanked by two chairs. There is a small writing desk against the left wall. The walls are hung with scrolls of Chinese paintings and calligraphy, along with two Dutch-style landscape paintings. This East-meets-West arrangement on the walls strongly indicates the half-modern, half-traditional atmosphere of the family.[10)]

Indeed, beginning with *Zhongshen dashi,* Republican drama often features an ineffective father as aborted, rather than restorable, figure of order occupying the living room, thus revising a patrilocal tradition of symbolic conflict settlement between generations and genders. In the farce of Mr. Tian, we witness a historical butt of joke, who turns out to be more than an inoperative figure of domestic power salvageable by political inventions of the state, as in pre-modern traditions. As he presides over the house of agony, where the moral choice of self-determination propagated by Chen is about to supersede a defunct law that regulates marital age, he is more than an individual persona, but offers an ironic secondary mask for tensions that cannot be masked. To

10) *CAMCD*, 57.

simultaneously please wife (rejecting the marriage but not because of fortune-telling) and appease daughter (endorsing her anger at maternal babble but not her proposal for marriage), Mr. Tian seeks to blithely take up the middle ground. He asserts fatherly authority by attempting to curb at once the former's zealousness and the latter's irascibility, and by adopting a rallying approach of reason and humor to wriggle his way out of the sexual rift and resulting ideological antipathy threatening to undo the integrity of his word and world.

But his reason and humor ring hollow. As jarring decorations on the wall, the concurrence of old and new in him seems a mere accident rather than a worked-out and consistent position. Determined to make peace, Mr. Tian is out of touch with the challenge that lies at the bottom of Yamei's attraction to the beyond. To the urgency of her passions, the taboo inferred from the *Analects* and embarrassment of Mr. Chen's money are ridiculously remote. As mother and daughter talk past each other, the father's cunning in evoking a middle ground comes to nothing. Family integrity and filial happiness turns out to be mutually exclusive. A battle must be waged to determine the winner and loser. In a time of change, reconciliation, now tried and failed, has to be ditched in the interest of drastic transformation. Though it is apparent that the limits of Hu Shi's representation coincide with the interior of the paternal house, and the play is by spatial suggestion an instance of domestic drama, it is domestic drama in an ironic sense, given the emphasis upon the dissolution of its dominion, of the vanity of domestication. Extended from the spatialized conflict composed via the *mise-en-scène, Zhongshen dashi* is a projection of domesticity to highlight the inevitability of its inter-generational if not inter-sexual breakdown. For early Republican spoken drama, of which I take Hu Shi's work as blueprint, the overall spatial metaphor may thus be characterized as an irony of space, a space rendered impossible, one that is to implode in the face of audience projected and physical. In the end, it is Tian Yamei, the agonized, radical young woman who carries the day. That little writing desk to provide

the only distraction from the room's symmetrical furnishings indeed becomes the physical beginning point of her iconic withdrawal from the house, of the house's "de-completion" so to speak, where she pens her farewell note. And yet, when finishing her note, she walks over and places it on the centrally enshrined round table, under the flower vase, as if it is still addressed to the center that has lost its hold, her last sentimental complaint and a parting token of attachment to the ineffective father and a lost home. From this point on, she is her Noraesque and spectral own. But at this point, when she moves toward the exit, the function of the stage is also reduced from a non-home to be given up to a catapult toward a virtual place of her choice. Oriented toYamei, its spectral other, the stage, or the space of the father, now works less as a forced togetherness than as instrument of dynamic leverage. It constitutes the axis of her turn.

It does not require much knowledge of Chinese literary and dramatic history to recognize that in the first decades of twentieth century, particularly the May Fourth Movement, early occurrences of the young woman, giving up a known world and not quite reaching the other, makes up a curious persistence of an inter-worldly phenomenon. Tian Yamei takes a leap not only toward an ungraspable future but also toward Nora Helmer of Ibsen's *Et dukkehjem*, equally ungraspable, thus her Noraesque denomination. Such about-face from "home reality" is often said to have lent force to Republican China's programs of social emancipation, e.g., the articulation of "New Women."[11] But in her generic designation, the so-called Noraesque woman embodies suspense in terms of both dislocation and bimorphism: no more her old, pre-Noraesque self, but not quite Nora yet. Insofar as arrival at her desired place remains a projection, the powerful, disowning perspective she achieves over herself by claiming solidarity with an alien figure is

11) Haiyan Lee, *Revolution of the Heart: A Genealogy of Love in China, 1900–1950* (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 2010).

compromised by mere insistence upon that solidarity to bespeak of a measure of generic wishfulness. Particularly, whereas Nora launches her personal transformation by masculine mimesis in the paternal context, Yamei's parallel approach to the male characters remains problematic. By the Ibsenian masterwork, Nora takes on masculine identity twice, first secretively and illegally, then openly and disruptively in a moral sense. To fund her husband Torvald's recovery from a life-threatening illness, she forges her deceased father's signature for a loan, thus committing a felony that would catch up with her and threaten the husband's career. Then, in the midst of a domestic confrontation at the end of the play, Nora also manifests interest to take over Torvald's masculine position:

> HELMER: First and foremost you are a wife and mother.
> NORA: I don't believe that any longer. *Jeg tror, at jeg er først og fremst et menneske, jeg, ligesåvel som du* (I believe that I am first and foremost a human being just as you are) — *eller ialfald, at jeg skal forsøge på at bli'e det* (or at least that I must try and become one)...[12)]

Of course, by the time when Nora reaches this second transformation, the long-observed silence over her first has no application. Rather than appropriating the husband's position in secret, she openly declares her assumption. By her earlier account, domestic bliss is predicated on feats of romantic unison, which is indeed to pivot on men's romantic assumption of the feminine position. The "most wonderful thing" she anticipates is for Torvold to step forth and claim responsibility for what she did on his behalf when she gets caught. Since "tens of thousands of women" sacrificed their honor for the ones they love, why can't men

12) Henrik Ibsen, *A Doll's House*, trans., Joan Tidale, (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 2002), 105. Italicization mine.

reciprocate the indulgence? This is especially so, given that she prepares to take her life and prevent Torvald from suffering from real consequences of her past aberration. However, as the husband disappoints her, Nora's position is radically alternated when she states: "I don't believe in anything wonderful," and rescinds the earlier insistence upon selflessness and its mutuality. Now she contends in no ambiguous terms that her ultimate duty is to herself. If wonder means men model their behavior on women, in its absence women act as men.

For Hu Shi's vision of modern culture, which is by no means to consciously endorse stasis or equilibrium, the young woman's departure is forcibly opposed to what he sometimes designates as Chinese theater's traditional tendency toward terminal reconciliation. By his observation, the latter receives typical expression in an old operatic preference for some grand roundup (*da tuanyuan*), a finale that he not only dismisses in the paternal space of *Zhongshen dashi,* but further generalizes as evidence of China's smug pre-modern mindset uninformed by a more properly modern aesthetic of the tragic. Now that the anxious daughter in his own work does not reconcile, her action is meant for an entirely different, though not necessarily tragic, form of sense-making: her breakaway is concluded not at restful end but in terminal restlessness. In her directionally bounded, or temporally lagging but inexhaustibly productive, transgression, Yamei upsets the traditional theater's coupling of beginning and conclusion, trauma and healing, disruptive filial and female breakout and negotiated patrilocal resettlement. As systematically irreparable disruption, her action serves not to merely replace the premodern inclination to resolving differences by patrilocal compromise highlighted in Mr. Tian's spatialized role conveyed via the set. Rather, the temporal breach of *Zhongshen dashi* takes characters and audience to an energy-charged point of non-conclusion with their historical momentum. And by this strategic merit alone, that I argue Hu Shi's seemingly underdeveloped piece of Ibsenian study proposes the notion of a present radically unconnected from past and future.[13] And the designation of

the snapping point where the present ends and future is yet to begin would call for an alternative examination of the relationship between *Zhongshen dashi* and *Et Duukehjem,* especially in regard to that apparent uniculturalist, westernizing imagination of the high May Fourth. As with many of his colleagues, Hu Shi is known for his advocacy of Chinese cultural modernization as an *unessential* cultural effort to bring about appreciation and endorsement of values articulated through an *essential* western canon. Given the interhistorical reference to sustain the latter as a paragon of cosmopolitan values, it may be argued that the May Fourth creative works often project a pivotal cultural program to conduct into China a foreign corpus that is both substantial and transformative, from which Chinese modernism extends in a not only imitative but also introductory capacity. A crucial detail that C. T. Hsia passes over in pinpointing the May Fourth modernists' false hope is that they, with Hu Shi in the vanguard, never meant to create a culture radically of their own. Rather, their modernist culture is always deployed to signify in tandem with its cosmopolitan master corpus.

The penetrating insight, though somewhat blunted by postcolonial justification of the mimetic, retains some resonance as long as it addresses Hu Shi's abstract musings over the "decadence" of the self, i.e., not only a China in desperate need of modernization but also a certain deficiency in Chinese authorship as pre-text for introducing the foreign corrective and fulfilment. So much so that even blatant enunciations of orientalism are by default overlooked, such as Helmer's comments on Mrs. Linden's knitting in Act III of *Et dukkehjem*, "But knitting is always ugly — your arms close to your sides, and the needles going up and down — *dat har noget kinesisk ved sig* (there is something Chinese about it)." The convenient focus on the essentialized Noraesque dimension certainly has the benefit of saving the readers embarrassment about

13) Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

the sole mention of China in this co-founding piece of Chinese modernism. To the extent that it is inconceivable for Hu Shi and his contemporaries that something like *Zhongshen dashi* may equal *Et dukkehjem* in artistic or even social worth especially by a globally projected vantage point, the May Fourth modernist enacts a textual production that takes for granted, rather than critically taking off from, the masterwork's authority. For *Zhognshen dashi* to make modern sense in Republican China, Hu Shi has to configure himself, not as the stand-in for Ibsen, but as an "Ibsenian apprentice," and Yamei a specter of Nora. Whereas colonial modernization is an off-shore destiny that has yet to take place in China, the May Fourth modernist does not experience, in the making of Republican high culture, the colonial self-disavowal to effectively organize a frame of reference at his own expense, and discriminate by successfully turning himself into an object. Instead, his colonization is not complete, as Yamei never is able to land in the profile of Nora. In the semicolonial modernist's quest for cosmopolitan values, this may suggest that identification with the latter is often so tenaciously insisted on that what remains in effect is a desire for cosmopolitanism that categorically defies gratification and only seeks the desire's own performance or realization such as through sustenance of a gap that registers the difference between a pre-modern China and a cosmopolitan west.

The distance between *Et dukkehjem* and *Zhongshen dashi* then may be put to a very different use than by postcolonialist critique. The inevitable incongruence between Europe and China, between master text and its introductory *étude*, obviously does not create a context to negotiate away the former's authority as sometimes expected. What constitutes a prominent factor in early Republican discourse on western modernism is the counter-discursive insistence upon the original instances by the gap that is repeatedly reinstated as by the mother's nonsense. In Hu Shi's symbolic pronouncement of China's modernist project via Yamei, the rendition of a Norwegian masterpiece by the Chinese study acquires compelling force by a vision of the erased self.

But dormant in this foundational reduction in Republican drama and much of May Fourth modernism that resonates with it is ultimately not hybridity that generically defers signification but a certain rapture to brings to life the precarious now, a temporal practice situated between signifiers. Insofar as inadequacy of mediation provides the most telling testimony to the relentless desirability of the unmediated, the former becomes the ultimate steward of the latter's disappearing presence. If Hu Shi's miming devastates, it does so not to the mimed authority, but to himself. As in holy acting, he always makes sure that he remains devastated, wiped clean, a condition that is for him the ultimate source of productive inspiration, where he communicates the terrifying voice that is not his, transforms exaggerated vulnerability into contagious cultural charisma, and translates reflexive self-renunciation into the aggression of absolute truth. Confucian China's modern fate is thus, for all its aversion to the eruptive sublime, a radical implosion only to release the latter. The fault line of miming does not lie between miming and the mimed, or the unmodern China and some colonial mother country radiating in modernity but between miming and unmimable, between inspired China and the arrival from beyond the horizon of inspiration, that is, from within the crack of modernist's own existential bimorphism and the uncoordinated aspects of the Noraesque turn.

At curtain fall, the querulous young woman is gone. The next phase of her life plays out not on stage, but in an inferred place. Quitting the parents' house, she plunges into the unrepresented and unrepresentable, and of unending pain and pleasure. But since there is unfinished business, the curtain bespeaks interval, beginning as much as closure. Moving off stage, she does not diffuse the play's stubborn opposition to what it represents. Instead, the departure is her last gestural indication and personal testimony to such opposition. To sever her body from the house that extends parental hold, the uniquely meaningful "unrepresentable" provides powerful motivation. In the evoked lover, she sees what the audiences cannot see, and communicates an object of desire the

latter may only access in cited traces, but are engaged to identify with and indulge anyway. A militant index to the limit of representation, she draws them to a fascinating space of the *beyond* as if they were as desperate and trusting. Hers is a one-dimensional action, a single-minded indication in here of there. Resolutely turning from the stage to its specter, her about-face conjures up the quintessential ambiguity between void and possibility. She does not belong but, by the determination of her move, promises to make space, and herself, on disappearance. A woman violently tearing in her historical *contrapposto*, and in erasing her figural identities, is ultimately an arousing myth that both demands and defies gratifying readings.

4

Representations of Antiquity in Ancient China and Early modern Japan:

Reading the *Xunzi*

Takahiro Nakajima

Abstract

How are we to think, regarding the representation of antiquity? Through reference to ideas of the world as plural and to antiquity as a singularity, I consider this problem as it appears in the ancient Chinese text the *Xunzi*, and in the thought of the early modern Japanese reader of the *Xunzi*, Ogyū Sorai. Specifically, I analyze the implications of their two conceptions of the former kings and later kings.

Introduction

Why is it that antiquity should be considered a problem? Imagine, for example, early modern Europe. In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Jesuits first transmitted Chinese learning to Europe. Again, in the seventeenth century, Europeans became greatly interested in ancient Egypt. Thus came into existence "antiquities" that were more ancient than the world, understood as the Creation of God, as transmitted in the Bible. This was a problem that shook the foundations of the

Christian religion. Still more troublesome to the Europe of that day, China represented the possibility of a society established without God as its basis. Thus, Chinese society, by being older than Europe and by opening the possibility of a society with atheistic foundations, served as the provision for a transformation in early modern European erudition, and set the stage for the Enlightenment.

To put it another way, the question of antiquity necessitates a confrontation with the reality that the world is not singular, but multiple. In a world thoroughly penetrated by a specific set of religious beliefs, antiquity has its origins in the present, and serves perhaps as a warrant to meanings of the present day. However, when the world is understood as multiple, antiquity operates as a type of heteronomy, and destabilizes the world. Making use of the different social imaginations that were present in antiquity, one can imagine other ways of conceiving present society. Thus, the way we represent antiquity has the power to change our current world or to preserve it. Whichever path is chosen, if antiquity is not somehow domesticated, the world of today is in danger of collapse.

In that case, the representation of antiquity must be considered a question of political relevance. Who, and with what authority, represents the world, is a question of vital significance to politics. This can be seen by looking at ways of representing antiquity. It is of utmost importance to make maximal use of the heteronomy of antiquity, and not to be controlled by it. However, the situation of antiquity as a political problem is not unique to early modern Europe, but, as far as it is a matter of confronting the plurality of the world, it is a question that will inevitably arise.

In this paper, I examine this question, as taken up in ancient China in the *Xunzi* and by the Edo period scholar Ogyū Sorai, in his reading of this text.

I. Rectification of names and the later kings in the *Xunzi*

The *Xunzi* chapter "Rectification of Names" contains well-known discussions of the arbitrariness of the sign, as in "fixing names in order to distinguish objects" (The *Xunzi* 22.1) and on the fixing of language and establishment of custom, as in "agreements are fixed, customs established" (The *Xunzi* 22.2) — linguistic discourses reminiscent of Saussure. However, this is not simply a linguistic discourse, but simultaneously a powerful political philosophy. As the *Xunzi* states:

> If a king were to appear, he would certainly follow the old names in creating new names. (The *Xunzi* 22.2a)

As we see here, in the *Xunzi*, the importance of the name comes from the fact that names are instituted by the ruler, because the act of naming is a political one. As we see in this quotation, a new king "establishes names, in accordance with the old names." That is to say, layering together the historical dimension with the power dimension (the arbitrariness of the creation of language), new names are made by newly repeating the former names of the past. It is with regard to this operation — taking as the subject the repetition of the former names — that the *Xunzi* summons the rulers of his present day, whom he dubs "later kings."

> As for the later kings' establishment of names, they followed the Shang dynasty in the terminology of criminal law, the Zhou dynasty in the names of titles of rank and dignity, and the Rituals in the names of forms of culture. In applying various names to the myriad things, they followed the established custom and general definitions of the central Xia states. (The *Xunzi* 22.1)

Here, examples are put forth of the former names that must have been

followed by the later kings, that is, the various names that were used by the former kings of the Shang and Zhou. It is not the case that the later kings produced names from a blank slate, but they repeated anew names that had existed in the ages of the former kings.

II. The plurality of the world: "other" communities and translation

That said, is it the case that this historicity only holds for communities that hold in common a "rectification of names" — that is, only those in which more or less similar language and rules (e.g., of music and rites) can circulate? In the *Xunzi* is it that the creative power of antiquity is being put to maximal use, but that there is in fact no path for completely new ways of repetition?

In consideration of these questions, let us look at how the *Xunzi* approaches "other" communities:

> The ordinances of those kings observed the qualities inherent in the land forms and regulated with ordinances the vessels and implements. They judged the various distances and so differentiated grades of tribute and offerings. Why should it be necessary that they all be uniform? Thus, the people of Lu use cups as tribute, the people of Wei use vats, and the people of Qi use containers made of hide. When the soils, lands, and inherent qualities of the topography are not the same, it is impossible that their vessels and implements should not be differently prepared and ornamented. Accordingly, all the states of Xia Chinese have identical obligations for service to the king and have identical standards of conduct. The countries of the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di barbarians perform the same obligatory services to the king, but the regulations governing them are not the same. (The *Xunzi* 18.4.2)

Geographically distant communities, the Man, Yi, Di, and Rong here contrasted with the Xia are described as having the same obligatory services, but different regulations governing them. That is to say, the *Xunzi* admits of the plurality in the world. Though the different states have different regulations, they have the same obligatory services. Thus, community is formed by applying the same principle to different contents.

This is easy to see if we examine how foreign languages are dealt with in the *Xunzi*:

> Gan, Yue, Yi, and Mo children make the same noises when they are born, but as they grow up they have different customs. It is instruction that brings this about. (The *Xunzi* 1.1)

The discussion of differing customs here, on top of taking language as a product of "agreements are fixed, customs established" (The *Xunzi* 22. 2), takes differences in language not as a matter of linguistic ability, but as an acquired habit. Thus, communication between languages is made possible through the establishment of some kind of conversion code.

> [If] they take great care to stipulate the [languages and conversion codes of] territories of distant regions and differing customs, then as a result, they are able to communicate. (The *Xunzi* 22.1)

Undoubtedly, to stipulate (that is, to promise or to fix) a conversion code, as with a pact, is not something that can be brought forward after the fact. The use of foreign languages in the *Xunzi*, arises from the circumstance of exchange (e.g., in translation or trade) with foreign states, and so the possibility of communication is a given. At least within that horizon, the *Xunzi* achieves an exchange with and among different communities.

This being the case, in the *Xunzi*, the plurality of the world is not a

radical plurality, but a starting point for its thought. And this approach to antiquity in the *Xunzi* brings about a distinction between it and other Confucian works: rather than taking antiquity as an absolute origin point on which the order of the world is constructed, he treats it historically, forming a connection to his present day and opening the way to plurality.

This way of thinking in the *Xunzi* was important for one strain of the *Xunzi* revival in the Qing dynasty. Ishii Tsuyoshi has written on the debt of Dai Zhen to the *Xunzi* as follows: "In light of the push to 'oppose the Song, revive the Han' among the scholars of the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras, the revival of the *Xunzi* was a natural outcome." (Ishii 2017, 2) The *Xunzi* was summoned as a way of treating pre-Han antiquity in the Qing, a period of rule by non-Han, when Song dynasty philosophy, based in the absolute truth of *li* 理, was insufficient to explain the plural nature of the world.

III. The methodology of Ogyū Sorai: towards antiquity via language

The question of antiquity was taken up in Japan by Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), somewhat earlier than Dai Zhen (1724–1777). Sorai was contemporaneous with Nicolas Fréret (1688–1749) who thought of "antiquity" problem in Europe then. It is well known that Sorai transformed Edo period scholarship, but the two Ming dynasty Classicists such as Li Panlong and Wang Shizhen were likewise crucial for the turn in Sorai's thought. Li Panlong strictly adhered to the famous thesis of the Classicist Li Mengyang's assertion that "As for *wen*: Qin and Han; as for poetry: High Tang." Which is not to say that the Classicists simply advocated for "restoring the ancients." If nothing else, we see imitation and innovation of a long-running discourse that began at least with the Old-Style writing of Han Yu 韓愈. In short, imitating antiquity here means taking antiquity as singularly creative — not simply imita-

ting others, but establishing one's own originality. "Imitate, but do not be an imitation," this is the hidden proposition of Chinese literature down to the Classical School.

Sorai's turn in thought followed from this proposition. One is to approach what is original in antiquity, and this must be directly recovered in the present. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to renounce the interpretations of the periods that followed antiquity. In particular, the interpretations of the Zhu Xi school had to be abandoned. However, the difficulty here is that the antiquity being referenced, from the Japanese perspective, is not only distant in time, but also in space — a heterotopic ancient China. How was it possible for Sorai to forge a direct connection with this antiquity, given that the difficulty for him is so much greater than that faced by Dai Zhen while conceiving of Han studies in the Qing?

It is here that Sorai appealed to language. In the parlance of China, antiquity is to be understood as the Way of the former kings, constructed in antiquity. Here Sorai's own experience comes into play: he had attempted to understand the classics using Sino-Chinese readings and, communicating through interpreters, he learned the contemporary Chinese language of his day. Moreover, it was by means of plowing through Classicist texts that he became capable of a *guwen* reading of the classics.

IV. The Way produced by the former kings and the scope of the ancient sages

What of the antiquity recovered by Sorai? In his "Distinguishing the Way" and "Distinguishing Names," the essence of antiquity lies in the Way established by the former kings, as embodied in the system of governance by "rites and music, laws and punishments." What is important here is that this, as the product of the sages of antiquity, is a supreme principle that can never be altered. This holds not only for the

common man, but even for the sage Confucius himself.

However, the later Confucians (especially Zixiang and Mengzi) thought that "as for the sages, through learning one may reach [them]" ("Distinguishing Names," Ogyū 1973, 218) and thereby misunderstood the Way of the former kings. The interpretations of the much later Zhu Xi school go as far as saying, "Learners seek within their own thought principles that arise from things, and thereby construct rites and music, laws and punishments" ("Distinguishing the Way," 201). However, for Sorai, it cannot be the case that any latter-day person can overwrite the word of the ancient sages that constructed the Way of the former kings.

On this point, it is necessary to draw a line between Sorai and the *Xunzi*, his most powerful source of influence other than Li Panlong and Wang Shizhen. Sorai was greatly influenced by the *Xunzi*, in considering the Way as a construct of the sages, in the separation of heaven and man, and especially in his perspective on language. For example, while discussing the origins of names in the opening of "Distinguishing Names," he says, regarding objects that are not visible to the eye, that it is only when the sages named these things that people were first able to perceive them (see, "Distinguishing Names," 209).

However, as for the act of naming, because names can arise freely from several perspectives, various relationships exist between names and things. This is what makes necessary the rectification of names. On this point Sorai follows the *Xunzi*, in taking language as sign and as mutually binding. This is namely what he says in "On reading the *Xunzi*:"

> Although a name does not have a fixed meaning, it is the case that names were given, as when the former kings established names in the very beginning, heaven as *ten*, earth as *chi*. This is the meaning in the *Xunzi*. Things were bestowed names, [by the former kings] to the common people, in a mutual agreement, this name as sign [of that thing]. If these were to be altered, even though they had been agreed upon, then people would become

> confused as to what should be called heaven, and what earth. Which is to say there is no meaning. ("Reading the *Xunzi*," Ogyū 1975, 107)

Having said that, Sorai does not completely follow the *Xunzi* regarding the rectification of names. Sorai does not grant the later kings the ability to establish or alter the word of the former kings that we have seen in our above discussion of the *Xunzi*, where the new names and ways constructed by later kings are modeled after those of the former kings.

It is by means of a strong interpretation that Sorai checks the power of the later kings. Again, in the *Xunzi* chapter "Rectification of Names," he says regarding the later kings' creation of names that they make new names based on the old names, but Sorai interprets this as follows: "In my opinion, as for what are called names, these are things constructed by the sages, and cannot be altered" (ibid., 102). For Sorai, new names and the old names constructed by the ancient sages both had to constitute the Way of the former kings. Sorai, by limiting the scope of [the term] "later kings" to the ancient sages, tried to erase the potential for new constructs or changes, after the time of the sage kings. He limits the scope of later kings to King Wu and King Wen: "The commentary says that the later kings were the contemporary kings of that day, but that is an error. 'Later kings' refers to kings Wen and Wu of the Zhou." (ibid., 120)

V. The repetition of the way of the former kings in Japan

Now, why was it that the way of the former kings had to be reduced in scope to this extent, as the products of pre-Confucian sages only? The reason for this is that after Confucius — more concretely, since the establishment of imperial China with the Qin emperor — the way of the former kings had been lost to China. On the other hand, in Japan,

under the feudal system of the Tokugawa *bakufu*, it still remained a distinct possibility. Yoshikawa Kōjirō goes further, arguing that Sorai flattered himself and that in him a second Confucius had appeared in Japan (Yoshikawa 1975, 241f). In short, the Way of the former kings constructed by the seven sages (Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Zhou) was formed as a universal principle. In China, their way had fallen into decline, and it was these that Sorai sought to revive. It is for this reason that, contrary to the *Xunzi*, he had to make the claim that there had not appeared in recent times any later kings with the ability to construct a Way and to make changes to the Way laid down by the former kings. This is because in the world of East Asian thought, the singularity of antiquity was all, and it was thought that it had to be repeated properly and correctly.

Sorai's political ideal of laying a foundation for the legitimacy of the Tokugawa *bakufu* in the Way of the former kings was aimed at effecting a revolution that would realize the Way of the former kings in his time. This was a governance that, while securing ancient China's system of rites and music, laws and punishments within the singularity of antiquity, increased the bid on Japan, so far removed in time and space, as a place ripe for the revival of the Way of the former kings.

Conclusion

At the same time, the power of the exteriority or heteronomy of antiquity cannot remain suppressed, as Sorai sought to. The reason why antiquity is overflowing with creative potential is that it has an iterability, a constant openness to the potential for being repeated. This is something stated long ago, though in a more limited sense, in the *Xunzi*.

Contrary to Sorai's use of language to establish a direct connection with antiquity, what the *Xunzi* accomplishes is to avoid, by means of his reinterpretation of language, the idea of antiquity as a singularity, which is in the idea that later kings who newly repeat the former kings do not

appear elsewhere in history. Sorai, who existed exterior to Chinese history, opened up a new history for Japan, and in so doing, paved the way for the *kokugaku* of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801).

References

McEwan, J.R. 1962. *The political writings of Ogyū Sorai*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lidin, Olof G. *The Life of Ogyū Sorai: a Tokugawa Confucian Philosopher*. Lund: Studentlitt, 1973.

Ogyū, Sorai. 1973. *Ogyū Sorai*. Eds. Yoshikawa, Kōjirō; Maruyama, Masao; Nishida, Taichirō; Tsuji, Tatsuya. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Ogyū, Sorai. 1975. *Ogyū Sorai Zenshū.* Vol.3. Tokyo: Kawadeshobō Shinsha.

Yoshikawa, Kōjirō. 1975. *Jinsai, Sorai and Norinaga*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Naoki, Sakai. 1991. *Voices of the Past: The Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ansart, Olivier. 1998. *L'Empire du Rite : La pensée politique d'Ogyû Sorai Japon, 1666-1728*. Genève : Droz.

Pocock, J.G.A. 1999. *Barbarism and religion*. Vol. 1: The enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737–1764. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ishii, Tsuyoshi. 2017. The Revolution of the Ritual or the Revolutionary Ritual: For the Alternative Perspective to the Intellectual History of Contemporary China. In Proceedings of the "Intersection of Eastern and Western Civilization: the Dialogue with Michael Puett through the *Path*."

Afterword

Hanako Takayama

We are pleased to present this first booklet of the East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts (EAA). The contents of the booklet document the EAA Forum held on September 2, 2019. Inspired by the existence of several distinct grammatical forms of the past tense, this gathering was realized thanks to planning by faculty before EAA was launched. I vividly recall that my first assignment at EAA was to write a report on this event.

The first thing I'd suggest reading is the dialogue. It is a bit lengthy, but is the result of a free, relaxed conversation in an informal atmosphere. You will find a candid outline of the concerns and problematics we brought to EAA, and many points that we've been struggling with in both education and research. At that time, one question arose: how can we create a new platform for the liberal arts that crosses the borders between different universities? One of the ideas that came up was to publish a series of books that would visualize the landscape of such trans-university activities. I would like to celebrate the first step of that idea, which has been realized with the publication of this booklet. I hope it may serve as a first platform for the participants at the forum, and that this

can be developed in the future. Towards this end, I would be happy to receive your criticism.

While editing this booklet, I recalled Professor Nakajima's use of the phrase "future's past" during the forum. Today, we are in the future of that moment, and conversely it is now the present's past. At the end of the report, I wrote: "Looking back on that day, I reflect on the significance of the English word 'remote', and how it also implies spatial distance (e.g., 'remote control'). How can we continue to think about these questions after the forum, maintaining our relationships at a distance?" In less than six months, though, and regardless of where we live — near or far —, we have been separated by the COVID-19 epidemic. In this sense, the meaning of "remote" has taken on an even more spatial dimension. While this is a chaotic situation, I find it heartening that a book can provide an occasion for a reunion of sorts. At the same time, I would like to think more about the quality and act of gathering through a book: what kind of connection exists remotely? As I recall a memory of the evening of September 2nd, when the forum was completed and we — the participants — shared a happy conversation over a Chinese dinner, I find myself wondering why there is a sense it just happened recently, as if yesterday even, despite of the remoteness of that moment.

I would like to especially thank Dr. Sakura Yahata who led the editorial effort until her last day at our center, and Mr. Takuya Kuroda who gave us constructive advice for completing the first booklet. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all of our staff who supported this project, and I would like to thank Daikin for their generous support.

I hope to see you in the next booklet.

From Tokyo, at the end of a windy May.

About the Authors

Takahiro Nakajima (中島隆博) is Professor of Chinese Philosophy and World Philosophy at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo, and Director of the East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts (EAA). After graduating from the Graduate school of the Humanities, the University of Tokyo, he taught at Ritsumeikan University (1996–2000), and the University of Tokyo (1991–1996, 2000–). His publications include *Language qua Thought* (Iwanami, 2017), *Zhuangzi and the Happy Fish* (Eds. Roger T. Ames and Takahiro Nakajima, University of Hawai'i Press, 2015), *Philosophy of Evil* (Chikuma-shobo, 2012), *Praxis of Co-existence: State and Religion* (University of Tokyo Press, 2011), *The Zhuangzi* (Iwanami, 2009), *Philosophy in the Humanities* (Iwanami, 2009), and *The Reverberation of Chinese Philosophy: Language and Politics*, (University of Tokyo Press, 2007).

Tsuyoshi Ishii (石井剛) is Professor of modern Chinese philosophy and intellectual history at the Graduate School of the Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, and Deputy Director of the East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts (EAA). His publications include: *Qiwu de zhexue: Zhang Taiyan he Zhongguo xiandai sixiang de Dongya jingyan* (齐物的哲学：章太炎和中国现代思想的东亚经验, *The Philosophy of Equalization of All Things: Zhang Taiyan and the Encounter between Chinese Modern Thought and East Asia*, Shanghai: Huadongshifandaxue chubanshe, 2016), and *Tai Shin to Chugoku kindai tetsugaku: kangaku kara tetsugaku e* (戴震と中国近代哲学：漢学から哲学へ, *Dai Zhen and Chinese Modern Philosophy: From Philology to Philosophy*,

Tokyo: Chisenshokan, 2014). He also contributed chapters and articles to: Roger Ames and Jinhua Jia ed., *Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018), and David Der-wei Wang ed., *A New Literary History of Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017).

Yujie Zhu (朱煜杰) is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Heritage and Museum Studies, the Australian National University. He is the author of *Heritage and Romantic Consumption in China* (Amsterdam University Press, 2018), *Heritage Politics in China* (Routledge 2020; co-authored), and the co-editor of *Politics of Scale* (Berghahn Books, 2018) and *Sustainable Tourism Management at World Heritage Sites* (UNWTO, 2009). In addition, he has also published over 30 peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters on the political, ethical and cultural concerns that emerge through heritage practices. He is the Vice-President of the Association of Critical Heritage Studies.

John Zou (邹羽) is Professor of Comparative Literature at the Institute of Humanities, etc., Shanghai Tech University. His recent publications include: "Jiazhi weiji yu zhuti chongjian: *Zhongshedashi* de ninanzi mofang"(价值危机与主体重建：《终身大事》的拟男子模仿, Crisis in Values and the Reconstruction of Subjectivity: Masculine Mimesis in *The Most Important Event in Life*), in *Wenxue Pinglun* (Beijing, The Literary Review), 2019, vol. 3, pp. 101–109; and Zhanma zhi yu: *Licha sanshi*, renge guojia he shaju wutai shang de zhengzhi wenhua zhuanxing (战马之喻：《理查三世》, 人格国家和莎剧舞台上的政治文化转型, The War Horse as Metaphor: *Richard III*, the Person of State and the Politico-Cultural Transformation on Shakespearean Stage), in *Waiguo wenxue pinglun* (Beijing, The Foreign Literature Review), 2020, vol. 1, pp. 60–78.

Qin Wang (王钦) is Project Lecturer at the East Asian Academy for

New Liberal Arts (EAA), the University of Tokyo. He received his Ph. D. in Comparative Literature from New York University. He is the author of *Configurations of the Individual in Modern Chinese Literature* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) and the translator of the Chinese edition of Jacques Derrida's *Donner la mort*, and David Harvey's *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*.

Sakura Yahata (八幡さくら) is Visiting Researcher at the International Research Center for Philosophy (IRCP), Toyo University. After graduating from the Graduate school of Kobe University, she worked for the University of Tokyo as a JSPS Research Fellow (PD) (2014–2016), the University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (2016–2017), the Integrated Human Sciences Program for Cultural Diversity (IHS) as a Project Research Fellow (PD) (2017–2019), and the East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts (EAA) as a Project Assistant Professor (2019–2020). Her publications include *The Idea of Imagination in the Philosophy of Art by Schelling* (Koyo-shobo, 2017) (which won the 13th Award for Early Career Scholars from Schelling Gesellschaft Japan), *Die Stimmung in der Landschaftstheorie Schellings* (*Aesthetics,* 2018*,* 69 (1)), *Anerkennung der menschlichen Freiheit in Schellings Auslegung des Ödipus in seiner Tragödientheorie: Die Entwicklung von Philosophischen Briefen über Dogmatismus uns KIriticismus zur Philosophie der Kunst* (*Aesthetics,* 2016*,* 67 (1)), *Die Einbildungskraft in Schellings Kunstphilosophie: Übernahme und Entwicklung des Kantischen Schemas und Symbols* (*Philosophy* (*Tetsugaku*), 2016, 67).

編集者

中島隆博（EAA 院長）
髙山花子（EAA 特任研究員）

編集協力

具裕珍（EAA 特任助教）
前野清太朗（EAA 特任助教）
M. Downing Roberts（EAA 特任研究員）
宇野瑞木（EAA 特任研究員）
若澤佑典（EAA 特任研究員）
崎濱紗奈（EAA 特任研究員）

EAA Booklet 1
Recent Past & Remote Past

編　　者　中島隆博・髙山花子
発 行 日　2020 年 6 月 10 日
発 行 者　東京大学 東アジア藝文書院
製作協力　一般財団法人 東京大学出版会
デザイン　株式会社 designfolio ／佐々木由美
印刷・製本　株式会社 真興社