

**International Association for Japanese Philosophy**  
**Sixth Annual World Conference:**  
**ONE, MANY, AND OTHER, PROSPECTS FOR A POST-  
PANDEMIC, POST-COLD-WAR POLYCENTRIC WORLD**  
**August 16-17, 2023**  
**Official Program**

Organized by:

International Association for Japanese Philosophy  
Dept. of Religious Studies, Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Co-sponsored by:

International Association for Japanese Philosophy  
Dept. of Religious Studies, Hobart and William Smith Colleges  
Dept. of Philosophy, Hobart and William Smith Colleges  
Dept. of Asian Studies, Hobart and William Smith Colleges  
Young Memorial Trust at Hobart and William Smith Colleges  
Dept. of Japanese Philosophy, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University  
The East Asian Academy for New Liberal Arts, University of Tokyo (EAA)

Welcome to the 6th annual conference of the International Association for Japanese Philosophy and its first meeting in continental North America. The IAJP aims at 1) further reinforcing Japanese philosophy as a global academic discipline; 2) exploring the potential of Japanese philosophy in contributing to the contemporary world faced with differences and difficulties; and 3) developing a solid network for researchers working on Japanese philosophy. The conference will inquire into the prospects for planetary coexistence in a post-Cold War, post-pandemic, and plural world, and the contribution Japanese philosophy—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—can offer in this regard. “Coexistence” can be for a politically plural world amongst peoples or nations, or even within a nation, especially in light of recent wars and divisions, international and domestic. “Coexistence” may also be for ecological sustenance with nature, other species, other beings, etc. How are we to face ecological, economic, or viral threats (e.g., the pandemic) without falling into totalitarian or inhumane measures in an increasingly divisive landscape? In the face of others, are we one or many? And in what sense? What contributions can Japanese philosophy offer here? The conference aims to foster civil and intellectual discussions on the topic and encourage further research. This is the first meeting of the IAJP in North America. Previous conferences were held in Fukuoka (Japan), Taipei (Taiwan), Beijing (China), Honolulu (US), and Kyoto (Japan). Next year (2024) we will meet in Rome (Italy).

This conference is dedicated to the memory of the late Carol Oberbrunner who was Assistant Professor of Philosophy; and Fay Botham who was Visiting Assistant Professor of Religious Studies and American Studies

**International Association for Japanese Philosophy**  
**Annual Conference 2023 August 16-17**  
**Official Program**

8/16 Wednesday

8:30-9:30 (Vandervort): Registration & light breakfast (provided)

9:45-10:00 (Vandervort): Welcome address:

- John Krummel (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
- Sarah Kirk, Provost, welcome

10:00-10:45 (Vandervort): Keynote 1:

- CY Cheung, chair
- Thomas Kasulis (Ohio State University): *Ningengaku* in an Era of Isolation;

11:00-12:00 (Vandervort): Session 1: Nishida and Tanabe

- Leah Kalmanson, chair
- Satoshi Urai (Hokkaido University): Subjectifying Society: An Enactive Approach to Coexistence in Tanabe Hajime's Social Ontology
- Mayuko Uehara (Kyoto University): The Self-and-Other Relation in Times of Crisis: An Inquiry into Nishida Philosophy and Tanabe Philosophy

12:00-1:30 (Saga): Lunch (on own)

1:30-3:00 (Stern 201): Session 2: Watsuji and the Environment

- Laura Specker, chair
- Kyle Peters (Chinese University of Hong Kong): Climate in the Age of "Countries that Have" and "Countries that Have-Not": Hayashi Tatsuo's Geopolitical Critique of Watsuji Tetsurō's Climate
- Cheung Ching-yuen (University of Tokyo): *Fūdo As Terruño*

3:15-4:45 (Stern 201): Session 3: Ethics of Play in the Kyoto School Tradition; chaired by Yuko Ishihara

- Yuko Ishihara, chair
- Sova Cerda (Kyoto University): Subjectivity, Refined and Inflected: Play in Early Nishitani
- Yuko Ishihara (Ritsumeikan University): Gadamer and Ueda on the "Playful" Encounter with the Other
- Hans Peter Liederbach (Kwansei Gakuin University): Games, Rules, and Spoilsports: Problems of the (Alleged) Anti-subjectivism in Kyoto School Philosophy

5:00~: Dinner (not provided) at local restaurants

8/17 Thursday

9:00-10:30 (Stern 201): Session 4: Perspectives on Watsuji

- Hans Peter Liederbach, chair
- Laura Specker Sullivan (Fordham University): The Ethics of Everyday Actions
- Anton Sevilla-Liu (Kyushu University): Watsuji Tetsurō, G.H. Mead, and Prosocial Contextual Behavioral Science
- Steve Bein (University of Dayton): There's Nothing To It: *Kū*, Compassion, and Extended Cognition in Watsujian Epistemology

10:45-11:45 (Stern 201): Session 5: Perspectives on Nishida

- John Krummel, chair
- Dennis Stromback (University of Tokyo): Is There a Concept of Forgiveness in Nishida's Discussion of Love?
- Rainer Schulzer (Toyo University): Why Hegel, Not Kant?

12:30-1:30 (Vandervort): Lunch (provided)

1:45-2:30 (Vandervort): Keynote 2:

- Leah Kalmanson, chair
- Shūdō Brian Schroeder (Rochester Institute of Technology): Facing the Non-Human Other: Buddha-Nature and Ethical Responsibility in Dōgen and Tanabe

3:00-4:00 (Stern 201): Session 6: Religion and Philosophy

- Mayuko Uehara, chair
- Griffin Werner (University of Hawaii at Manoa): Toward a Zen Buddhist Political Philosophy: An Experimental Dialogue Between Deleuze & Guattari and Dōgen
- Leah Kalmanson (University of North Texas): *Kami, Bodhisattva, Jina*: The Multiple Identities of Religious Diversity in Jainism and Buddhism

4:15-5:15 (Stern 201): Session 7: Political Philosophy

- CY Cheung, chair
- Richard Stone (Waseda University): The Metaphysics of National Essence: Individual, Environment, and State in the Work of Miyake Setsurei
- Bernard Stevens (Catholic University of Louvain): The Chinese "Overcoming Modernity" Ideology

5:30-6:15 (Vandervort): Keynote 3:

- Uehara Mayuko, chair
- Michiko Yusa (Western Washington University): Unexpected Coalescence? Nishida, Yogacara, and the New Directions in Phenomenology

6:30-8:15 (Vandervort): Reception dinner (provided)

AUGUST 16 WEDNESDAY  
KEYNOTE SPEECH 1: 10:00-10:45AM (VANDERVORT)  
CY CHEUNG, CHAIR

***NINGENAKU* IN AN ERA OF ISOLATION**

Thomas P. Kasulis  
University Distinguished Scholar, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Studies  
The Ohio State University, USA

Today we enjoy instantaneous global communication, lightning-speed transfer of information, convenient international travel, and mushrooming world trade. Yet, human isolation seems only to have increased. Social media has transformed “friend” into a transient, virtual relation between yourself and a potentially limitless number of others. The workplace may be a desk in your private residence with a personal computer rather than an office building. Chat rooms are as likely to link you to AI robots as to other people. The Covid pandemic has accelerated the isolation with distance-learning, home shopping, and movie streaming. Geopolitically, nativism and political/economic isolationism are on the rise, while the short-term self-interests of nation states block international cooperation addressing climate change.

Our modern Western philosophical anthropologies alone cannot adequately mitigate this isolation. Most depend on notions of individualism: autonomy, individual rights, freedom of expression, privacy, and the cultivation of personal satisfaction. However central such principles may be to a liberal democracy, they can also easily nurture radical isolationism.

Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎 offers a more traditionally Japanese philosophical anthropology based in betweenness and interdependence. That includes not only his analysis of human being as *ningen* 人間, but also his examination of the synergy between the human and the surrounding natural and cultural milieu as developed in his theory of *fūdo* 風土. Using those ideas to supplement our modern Western philosophical anthropologies, I will outline a more full-bodied approach to the crises of isolation we face today.

Yet, we should also ask why Japanese philosophy has done so little to mitigate isolation in Japan itself. Such well-documented issues include the dissolution of family bonds and the prominence of phenomena like the *hikikomori* shut-ins and isolated *otaku* geeks. My conclusion will suggest at least a partial answer.

Session 1: 11:00am-12:00pm (Vandervort):

## **Nishida and Tanabe**

### **Subjectifying Society: An Enactive Approach to Coexistence in Tanabe Hajime's Social Ontology**

Urai Satoshi

Hokkaido University, Japan

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) developed a social ontology known as the “logic of species” between 1934 and 1941. In this logic, he argued that the only way for humanity to coexist was to establish, in each nation, a “humane State” (人類的国家) capable of sharing prosperity among nations. In order to develop this State, he claimed that people must perform “self-sacrifice,” which is the only means to their “self-realization” as members of the State. While this idea of “self-sacrifice-sive-self-realization” is based on the Aristotelian concept of *zoon politikon* and was initially borrowed from Karl Jaspers' *Philosophy II* (1932), needless to say, it is problematic and in fact has received much criticism. Tanabe himself admitted that his standpoint risks being misunderstood, although he denies that it is irrational totalitarianism. What, then, is its philosophical significance? In order to clarify Tanabe's views on coexistence and the concept of “self-sacrifice-sive-self-realization,” this presentation focuses on the related idea of “subjectifying society” and considers these views in light of the enactive approach. It will be argued that what Tanabe aimed to express with the phrase “self-sacrifice-sive-self-realization” implies, not only a particular kind of self-transformation, but also an essential moment in the general formation of societies or groups by their members.

### **The Self-and-Other Relation in Times of Crisis—an Inquiry into Nishida Philosophy and Tanabe Philosophy**

Uehara Mayuko

Kyoto University, Japan

西田の言う「歴史的世界」において、今創造され、見られるこの世界は平時の社会においても、危機感を帯びたものであろう。実際、地球は環境、経済、地政学、国際関係などの危機の時代にあるという意識を、例えば日本の出版業、ジャーナリズム、ある研究者らは共有しているようだ。危機とは多面的、連鎖的、循環的であるように私には思われるが、この発表では、今、日本に目立ってきている孤独な弱い個人とその社会の危機に注意してゆきたい。そしてこの弱い個人という問題を、昭和の危機の時代を生きた西田幾多郎の自他論、および田辺元の社会存在の論理（＝種の論理）のそれぞれに関連づけて、検討する。まず、1. 田辺哲学の核心をなす「種の論理」の構造の内実を確認し、そこには社会存在論の基本単位と言える「我と汝」関係が欠落していることを指

摘する。次に、2. 西田の「我と汝」関係には対等性という特徴を浮き彫りにし、前向きに評価した上で、現実社会への適用が困難な点を確認する。3. 再び田辺哲学に戻り、他力の観点が加わる「「種の論理」以降の自他関係」論に、弱い個人を視野に入れる可能性があるのかを検討する。

田辺の論理は強い個人を要請しているように見えるが、現実の多様な人間には孤独な弱い個人が含まれる。発表者の主張は、彼らを放棄せず個人として生かす哲学が、求められなければならないということだ。

The world, in what Nishida calls the “historical world,” created and seen at this moment must be tinged with a sense of crisis, even within a society in peaceful times. In fact, publishers, journalists, and certain researchers in Japan share the awareness that the globe is in an period of crisis in terms of the environment, economy, geopolitics and international relations. It seems to me that crises are multifaceted, interlinked, and cyclical, but in this presentation I would like to draw attention to the crisis of the lonely and weak individual and their society, conspicuous today in Japan. We will examine this problem of the weak individual in relation to Nishida Kitarō's theory of self-and-other, and to Tanabe Hajime's logic of social existence (or logic of species). Both of them are the philosophers who lived through the crisis of the Showa era. 1. First, we will confirm the content of the structure of the "logic of species" that forms the core of Tanabe philosophy, and indicate its lack of the "I and Thou" relation, which can be said to be the fundamental unit of social existence. 2. Next, on the basis of highlighting and positively evaluating the equality which characterizes the "I and Thou" relation in Nishida, we will confirm the difficulty of applying his theory to actual societies. 3. Returning again to Tanabe philosophy, we will examine whether it is possible to include weak individuals in the visual field in his theory of the self-other-relation after his "Logic of Species" to which the perspective of “other-power” (salvation by faith) (他力) is added.

Tanabe's logic seems to require strong individuals, but in reality, the diversity of human beings include lonely and weak individuals. My claim here is that we need to seek a philosophy that enlivens them as individuals instead of abandoning them.

Session 2: 1:30-3:00pm (Stern 201):

## Watsuji and the Environment

Climate in the Age of “Countries that Have” and “Countries that Have-Not”: Hayashi Tatsuo’s Geopolitical Critique of Watsuji Tetsurō’s

Climate

Kyle Peters

Chinese University of Hong Kong

This presentation takes as its subject Hayashi Tatsuo’s critique of Watsuji Tetsurō, focusing especially on Hayashi’s 1938 “Fate of Thought” and Watsuji’s 1935 *Climate: An Anthropological Consideration*. Its aim is twofold. First, to introduce anglophone scholars to the work of Hayashi—an understudied Kyoto School philosopher, co-editor (with Watsuji) of Iwanami’s *Shisō*, and major force in the world of modern Japanese literary criticism. And second, to tease out Hayashi’s disguised critique of Watsuji’s theory of climate, and in particular, his foregrounding its disconnect with contemporary Japan’s place on a “world map [that] seems to have become so simple that it can be categorized into two or three different colors: ‘countries that have’ and ‘countries that have-not,’ or ‘democratic states’ and ‘totalitarian states.’” As I read it, Hayashi is questioning the legitimacy and applicability of climate as a concept in a—to connect with the conference theme—not-so-polycentric cold war world order.

## *Fūdo As Terruño*

Cheung Ching-yuen

University of Tokyo, Japan

*Fūdo* (風土) is a concept developed by Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), a modern Japanese philosopher. The Japanese concept has been translated into English, German and Spanish as “climate.” However, Augustin Berque tried to translate the notion as *milieu*. What is Berque’s understanding of *milieu*? For Berque, *milieu* is both natural and cultural; it is both subjective and objective; and it is both collective and individual. This idea can be found in Watsuji, but Berque’s ambition is to further develop *fūdo* as a “*fūdo*-logy,” or in his own word, “mesology.” Here, I believe the French word *milieu* cannot capture the rich meanings of nature and culture. Therefore, I have been translating *fūdo* with the French word *terroir*. While I explained my understanding of *terroir* to my Mexican colleagues in 2019, I was told that the Spanish word *terruño* does not only mean *terroir*, but it also means “homeland.” They say that the national flag of Ukraine is about the landscape of blue sky and yellow wheat field, but I would rather suggest it is an aesthetic expression of wind and earth (*fūdo*). *Fūdo* is not merely *milieu* or *terroir*, but can also be understood as *terruño* (homeland). Without doubt, we are facing a crisis of the homelessness (*desterramiento*): the blue wind and yellow land of the homeland of Ukrainians are replaced by grey sky and bloody scenes in battlefields. In this sense, *fūdology* has to condemn the destruction of *terruño* on one hand, and to revitalize the *terruño* on the other.

Session 3: 3:15-4:45pm (Stern 201):

## **Ethics of Play in the Kyoto School Tradition**

Yuko Ishihara, Ritsumeikan University, Chair

### **Subjectivity, Refined and Inflected: Play in Early Nishitani**

Sova P.K. Cerda

Kyoto University, Japan

Early readers of Nishitani Keiji's translated works (especially, *Religion and Nothingness* and *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*) commented on an apparent "slighting" attitude toward Western philosophy (O'Leary 1991), leading some to speculate about Nishitani's "anti-intellectualism" (Phillips 1987) and others to question his ability to grapple with basic ethical issues (Little 1989). Yet, such judgments might be hasty. These works were not originally written for readership abroad and many of their arguments appear with greater detail elsewhere (his *Studies in Aristotle* being a prominent example). While only a sliver of Nishitani's works has received critical study, an even greater dearth exists apropos Nishitani's early thought. This presentation aims to begin addressing this lacuna by considering "play" in early Nishitani.

Nishitani's early notion of "play" sheds light on his early commitments as regards subjectivity. In the first section, I introduce Nishitani's early claim that "working for the purpose of working is play (*Spiel*)," exemplary of which is the production of fine art. I then trace this claim to Nishitani's treatment of fine art in the 1926 "Kant's Aesthetic Ideas." In section two, I argue that there Nishitani persuasively innovates on Kant's theory of apperception. Even the most basic levels of sensuous life, so my reading goes, involve the participative work of subjectivity, a work that can, as in art, be refined. Although it is not yet clear how these early commitments hold over into Nishitani's later thought, this presentation aims to make a beginning in fleshing out Nishitani's position vis-à-vis the Western classics.

### **Gadamer and Ueda on the "Playful" Encounter with the Other**

Yuko Ishihara

Ritsumeikan University, Japan

In the context of giving an account of how genuine understanding of an artwork occurs, Gadamer introduces the idea of the "play of understanding." Contrary to the idea that the spectator looks for the hidden meaning of the artwork in the work itself, Gadamer tells us that the meaning of the artwork is brought forth in the back and forth movement between the spectator and the artwork. Extending this analysis to the I-Thou relation, Gadamer develops an account of a genuine encounter with the other that highlights the dynamic nature of the inter-*play* of understanding that makes possible such encounter.

What is striking is that we find a somewhat similar analysis of a genuine encounter with the other in Ueda Shizuteru. Drawing on examples from *renku* and *Zen mondo*, Ueda analyzes what the Zen Buddhist tradition has called the "dialogue of the mutual exchange of host and guest" (賓主互換の問答). According to Ueda, a genuine encounter, which he also says is "playful",

happens when there is a free exchange of roles between the host (I, we) and the guest (you). Particularly interesting is his claim that the kind of understanding that takes place in such an encounter is much more radical than Gadamer's "fusion of horizons." By drawing out both the parallels and the differences between the two thinkers, I will attempt to clarify the nature of the play that is involved in a genuine encounter with the other.

## Games, Rules, and Spoilsports: Problems of the (Alleged) Anti-subjectivism in Kyoto School Philosophy

Hans Peter Liederbach  
Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan

In post-Heideggerian philosophy, particularly in Gadamer, the notion of play is utilized to reveal the *aporiai* of *Reflexionsphilosophie* in German Idealism. Playing on the notion of play serves the purpose of showing that human self-understanding finds its limits at the facticity of (in Heidegger's terminology) thrownness. As the image of play is to invoke, human existence ought to be understood as primordially being imbedded in its world (which, for Gadamer, means to submit oneself to the transmission-event of effective-history).

As has been shown, Gadamer's objections to German Idealism, particularly Hegel, is an expression of a specific historical constellation, which was formed by Husserl's and Heidegger's attack on psychologism, Nietzsche's deconstruction of the subject, and the various appeals to the finitude of thought in post-Nietzschean thinking. Since, fueled by the reawakened interest in Kant and post-Kantian philosophy from the nineteen-eighties on, these anti-subjectivist strands of thought themselves have come under attack, it is time to reassess the potential, the notion of play has for human self-understanding.

Pertinent in this regard are the understanding of rule-following in post-Wittgensteinian pragmatics, and the various dimensions of normativity as being constitutive for our sense-making practices, which are emphasized in recent scholarship on Kant and Hegel. Harking back to these concepts, I will first discuss Gadamer's notion of play, before, in a second step, I will turn to the Kyoto School, particularly Nishitani and Ohashi. As will be shown, bringing into play the notion of play enables us to identify some of the problems connected to the (alleged) anti-subjectivism in Kyoto School philosophy.

AUGUST 17 THURSDAY

Session 4: 9:00-10:30am (Stern 201):

## **Perspectives on Watsuji**

### **The Ethics of Everyday Actions**

Laura Specker Sullivan  
Fordham University, NY, USA

The problems of the world often seem very large: pandemics, nuclear disasters, global warming, and so on. By contrast, the small changes we make in response – wearing a mask, turning down the thermostat, using less plastic – seem very small. In this paper, I highlight how the attention to everyday existence found in the work of diverse scholars of both Japanese aesthetics (e.g., Saito Yuriko, Kuki Shuzo, and Okakura Kakuzo) and Japanese ethics (e.g., Dogen Zenji, Watsuji Tetsuro, and Erin McCarthy) can be understood as a response to this anxiety about the status of the world. This strain of ethical-aesthetic Japanese thought attends to everyday objects and customs not as a form of myopia or selfishness, but out of an understanding of how the activity of human existence mediates the relationship between the one and the many.

### **Watsuji Tetsurō, G.H. Mead, and Prosocial Contextual Behavioral Science**

Anton Sevilla-Liu  
Kyushu University, Japan

Japanese ethicist Watsuji Tetsurō, Pragmatist philosopher G.H. Mead, and contemporary Contextual Behavioral Scientists Paul Atkins, David Wilson, and Steven Hayes' Prosocial Approach all share a radically relational approach to the human being. They draw from markedly different sources: Buddhism and Confucianism for Watsuji, pragmatism and behaviorism for G.H. Mead, and evolutionary science, economics, and Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS) for Atkins et al. They also emerged in remarkably different contexts and historical periods. Yet despite these differences, they converge deeply on three main points.

The first point is the non-duality of subject and object, where all three approaches see our lived reality as both meaningful (subjective) and part of behaving in a materially constrained environment (objective). Prosocial and Mead approach this through a combination of evolutionary science and human sciences like economics and psychology. Watsuji however shows the philosophical side of this through the clash between idealism and materialism in ethical thought, and his unique approach to the question of milieu (*fūdo*).

The second point is the non-duality of individual and community, where all three approaches see human behavior as both individual and relational, necessitating multiple levels of understanding in order to properly model meaningful action. Watsuji argues this philosophically, looking at individualist approaches to ethics and authenticity and pitting them against more communitarian approaches. Mead validates this psychologically, looking at the relational structure

of thought. And Prosocial does this via a unique approach to Multi-Level Selection (MLS) theory and a group approach to behaviorism.

And third, these theoretical points give shared implications for the application of ethics to education, particularly the question of individual vs. group values. This is a part where Watsuji and Mead are relatively weak, and perhaps the contemporary movement Prosocial can shine by showing how these philosophical ideas might be applied in the world today.

## There's Nothing To It: *Kū*, Compassion, and Extended Cognition in Watsujian Epistemology

Steve Bein  
University of Dayton

By Watsuji Tetsurō's lights, "One, Many, and Other" are holographic: each comprises the others in a polycentric matrix of intersubjectivity. Much has been written on how this is reflected in his ethics, far less on its role in his epistemology. According to Watsuji, we do not only act in the emptiness between persons, but much of our cognition happens in that betweenness as well. Indeed, for Watsuji subjective experience itself takes place in the emptiness between person and person. We discover ourselves through our openness to others, and so our subjective experience is shared. Linguistic expression comes second to our first medium of this experience, which is the body itself: posture, gesture, facial expression, and so on. Watsuji calls this "the practical interconnection of acts" (*jissenteki kōiteki renkan* 実践的行為の連関), and he says it is basic to our cognition.

It is a bold position to be sure. To say I do not infer your emotional states, but rather experience them in the emptiness that is intrinsic to human cognition, is the polar opposite of Descartes's cogito. But phenomenologically speaking, Watsuji's position is arguably the more convincing. Furthermore, it is echoed in both traditional Buddhist epistemology (compassionate wisdom is predicated on knowing other minds) and cutting-edge cognitive science (the extended mind thesis). This paper presents the argument that Watsuji's anti-Cartesian epistemology has surer footing than Descartes's epistemology, and that Descartes' conclusion ought to have been *cogito ergo sumus*, I think therefore we are.

Session 5: 10:45-11:45am (Stern 201):

## Perspectives on Nishida

### Is There a Concept of Forgiveness in Nishida's Discussion of Love?

Dennis Stromback  
University of Tokyo, Japan

This presentation begins with an investigation of Nishida Kitarō's discussion of love in *Zen no Kenkyū*. What Nishida claims in his early work is that love and knowledge are two different manifestations of the same fundamental reality. He writes: "To know a thing we must love it, and to love a thing we must know it." What Nishida is drawing attention to here is how the awakening of no-self (via knowing) is grounded in acts of love. It is the deep union of subject and object, where the self is casted away and unites with the other. Bear in mind that Nishida's view of love here is borrowed from Buddhist notions of compassion in which care and attention is given to the other in times of suffering. Like Buddhism, which seeks to liberate others from the causes of suffering, Nishida's view of love is the expression of the self dissolving into the other—in other words, the self negates itself in order to further establish the other. But what I ultimately want to argue in this presentation is that we can carve out an account of forgiveness based on Nishida's view of love in his early work. That is to say, if forgiveness is a practice of a higher form of love, as it is commonly believed, then love, as the groundwork of the non-dual self, is nothing other than the practice of forgiveness, and forgiveness is nothing other than repeated acts of love. The axiom of human life is co-existence, but conflict and divisions seem to be more of the rule of the day, which speak to the importance of recovering the lost art of forgiveness. This presentation seeks to re-assert forgiveness, as drawn from Nishida's view of love, with the hope of healing and addressing the fragmentations that prevent dialogue between warring factions.

### Why Hegel, Not Kant?

Rainer Schulzer  
Toyo University, Japan

For the non-initiated reader of Kyoto-School philosophy, a certain affinity between Nishida and Hegel seems to suggest itself. In 1929, Heidegger may have been the first to verbalize this impression. Based on the German translations of three of Nishida's essays in *Die intelligible Welt* (1943), the young German philosopher Wolfgang Harich (stepson of the musician Eta Harich-Schneider) planned to give a lecture in Berlin in 1944 in which he would characterize Nishida's philosophy as the "the rebirth of German Idealism in the womb of East Asian mysticism." Finally, in 1937 Nishida himself admitted that "My thought today owes a lot to Hegel. I think that it is closer to Hegel than to any other [philosopher]. At the same time, I have a lot to say to Hegel, too."

The question "Why Hegel, not Kant?" may be answered by certain features of East Asian Buddhist metaphysics that can be meaningfully compared with Hegel's dialectics. Thinking of British idealism, which was a powerful philosophical movement in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there was also no need to "revive idealism" for it to be influential in Japan. Besides such broader perspectives in intellectual history, however, there is also one circumstance in particular

that can be viewed as being pivotal in the turn away from Kant towards Hegel. That is the lecturing of Ernest F. Fenollosa at early Tokyo University.

In August 2023, I will be working at Yale University's Beinecke Library editing Fenollosa's philosophy lectures as noted by Kanai Noburu. In my presentation at the 2023 IAJP conference, I will report on Fenollosa's criticism of Kant, and his understanding of Hegel, based on the new materials. The investigation of Kant's early reception in Japan is part of a broader research effort for the upcoming 300th anniversary of Kant's birthday in 2024.

KEYNOTE SPEECH 2: 1:45-2:30PM (VANDERVORT)

LEAH KALMANSON, CHAIR

**FACING THE NON-HUMAN OTHER: BUDDHA-NATURE AND ETHICAL  
RESPONSIBILITY IN DŌGEN AND TANABE**

SHŪDŌ BRIAN SCHROEDER

ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, USA

The notion of “coexistence” finds expression in the philosophically complex concept of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), which is a fundamental cornerstone in Buddhist metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology. Mahāyāna Buddhism viewed this concept as closely associated with the teaching on emptiness or boundlessness (*śūnyatā*), the view that all phenomenal reality and experience is devoid of any essential and substantial identity. Early expressions of Buddhism interpreted Buddha-nature as pertaining only to sentient beings, but later this was extended in Chinese Buddhism to include insentient beings and objects. Eihei Dōgen developed this idea and formed the basis for an ecological thinking that has great resonance for the world today, especially given our current state of crisis in this regard. This paper develops Dōgen’s views in relation to the notion of ethical responsibility found in the later philosophy of Tanabe Hajime with brief reference to some Western standpoints.

Session 6: 3:00-4:00pm (Stern 201):

## **Religion and Philosophy**

### **Toward a Zen Buddhist Political Philosophy: An Experimental Dialogue Between Deleuze & Guattari and Dōgen**

Griffin Werner

University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA

In this presentation, I will discuss how Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the body without organs (BwO) can be helpful for conceiving of a politics of Zen Buddhism that accounts for how groups of people dedicated to the ethical ideals of compassion and wisdom can still find themselves in support of fascism. I argue that practicing zazen can be understood as a practice of making oneself a BwO. Zazen is a method of de-organizing and de-hierarchizing the body to penetrate the world and see it in its emptiness and interdependence. It is a practice of making oneself a "zazen body," one that is vulnerable enough and in attunement with the world such that it can experience objects from their mode of being in their interdependence with the self rather than from a separated subject-object perspective. However, as Zen's complicity with and support of the imperialist Japanese government during WWII tells us, dedicating oneself to the practice of zazen in order to achieve liberation and experience infinite wisdom and compassion does not necessarily lead to a politics of liberation. Like any becoming or change, there is genuine risk involved in dedicating oneself to a practice of making oneself a BwO. However, the potential reward is insight into newness that may also lead to solutions to contemporary ethical and political problems. However, in the case of Zen during Japanese imperialism, the BwO of Zen led to the support of fascism rather than its critique from a Zen inspired point of view.

### ***Kami, Bodhisattva, Jina: The Multiple Identities of Religious Diversity in Jainism and Buddhism***

Leah Kalmanson

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The term "polytheism" is not a compliment in the philosophy of religion. That is, whereas belief in a universal and transcendent God may be seen as rationally defensible, belief in anything else is relegated to the realm of superstition. This presentation, in contrast, takes seriously the plurality and locality of spiritual beings. In it, we investigate various attempts in both Jainism and Buddhism to navigate relations between devas, jinas, buddhas, bodhisattvas, and kami. We look in particular at Heian-era Japanese scholars who theorized about relations between the kami and foreign spiritual entities such as Buddhist bodhisattvas, at Edo and Meiji scholars who sought ways to put the kami on a par with the so-called universal and transcendent "Deus" of Christian missionaries, and at contemporary Buddhist-Jain interactions in East Asia. Throughout our exploration of this rich history of engagement with diverse spiritual entities across multiple traditions, we focus on how this philosophical heritage helps us navigate contemporary issues in religion, politics, and ecology.

Session 7: 4:15-5:15pm (Stern 201):

## Political Philosophy

### The Metaphysics of National Essence: Individual, Environment, and State in the Work of Miyake Setsurei

Richard Stone  
Waseda University, Japan

Journalist, philosopher, historian, and member of the nationalistic *Seikyosha* (政教社) publishing house, Miyake Setsurei (三宅雪嶺, 1860~1945) played a key role in various intellectual movements in Japan during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Most specifically, Miyake, alongside his compatriots in the *Seikyosha*, spearheaded the movement to preserve Japan's "national essence (国粹, *kokusui*)" in the face of – what they perceived as – uncritical Westernization during the Meiji period (1868~1912). Indeed, Setsurei was a leader in the charge to identify which aspects of Japanese culture needed preservation or were otherwise unique to the Japanese people.

Yet, while Miyake's role in these movements – and his potential relation to the growth of nationalism in 20<sup>th</sup> century Japan – has been largely recognized by historians, the precise content of his thought has rarely been critically analyzed. However, given not only that questions concerning identity and uniqueness in relation to nationalism are not only still relevant to our post-cold war society, but also that thorough analyses of discourse on *kokusui* can give us a better grasp on the history of nationalism in Japan, his work should not be left alone in this way. Hence, here I will provide a brief overview Setsurei's political philosophy, and thus attempt to search for the metaphysical basis of the *kokusui* movement can be found in an "organic" relation between individual, state, and environment, as well as identify potential clues for further understanding nationalism and identity in a contemporary setting.

### The Chinese "Overcoming Modernity" Ideology

Bernard Stevens  
Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium

After the opening up to the world market in the 1980s and the economic take-off during four consecutive decades, Xi Jinping's seizure of power in 2012 ushered in a period of increasing Communist Party control over all aspects of social life, including intellectual ones. A reflection on the history of China is now promoted in university studies with a strong reexamination of its imperial past. Renouncing the unequivocal rupture advocated by Maoism, it is a relative continuity that is now put forward - but going hand in hand with a rejection of the liberal impulse of the first Chinese revolution, that of 1911, and of the « modern » republican period which followed it until the communist revolution of 1949. Contemporary China is thus reconnecting in an ambiguous way with pre-modern China, emphasizing its own specificity, the only one capable to overcoming jointly the failures of Sovietism and Americanism. It is in this context that "Chinese values" are

displayed, proclaimed universal and intended to replace the values of European Enlightenment, that are considered only « regional » . And it is also in this context that a re-evaluation of the ancient notion of tianxia 天下 ("everything that exists under the same sky ») is meant to redefine China's role in the world. After two centuries marked by Western imperialism, it is China's turn to establish in the 21st century — overcoming current Western modernity — an “egalitarian and harmonious” world, according to the official ideology, whereas in reality, the notion of tianxia actually designated an imperial order establishing a hierarchical, authoritarian and exclusive balance of power between superiors and inferiors, civilized and barbarians. This is the background against which we can see a remake of the Japanese « overcoming modernity » ideology. Wang Hui’s essay on « Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity » (1997) will be here our main guide.

## KEYNOTE SPEECH 3: 5:30-6:15PM (VANDERVORT)

UEHARA MAYUKO, CHAIR

### UNEXPECTED COALESCENCE? NISHIDA, YOGACARA, AND THE NEW DIRECTIONS IN PHENOMENOLOGY

MICHIKO YUSA

WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, USA

1. NITTA Yoshihiro was a Japanese phenomenologist, who was introduced to Nishida Kitarō's writings in the early 1990s by UEDA Shizuteru, and who had the good fortune of reading Nishida's texts closely together with IZUTSU Toshihiko, with Ueda as the "discussion leader." (Nitta 1998, "postscript," 231-32)

2. Nitta, who brought his vast knowledge of Husserl and Heidegger to this "encounter," discovered, somewhat unexpectedly (?), much in Nishida's thought that was hitherto neglected by those who were trained in western philosophy. He realized also that the traditional hermeneutical constructions developed around Nishida's thought by the Japanese "Kyoto School" professors and students came with their own baggage, and, thus, limitations.

3. Nitta encapsulates the basic movement of the direction of phenomenological inquiry in Europe, from the start to the post-Husserlian and post-Heideggerian phase, in three stages:

(i) Husserl's phenomenological reduction, which attempted to pull away from the uncritical substantive thinking (*jittaika-teki shii*)—the attitude so ingrained in human thinking—was gradually enriched by the notion of horizon.

(ii) Husserl's "intentionality" of consciousness, and the "horizon"—the domain of meaning—did make significant philosophical contributions, but Husserl went beyond these early formulation, by investigating into the "other ego," and came to develop the view of "Lebenswelt" and intersubjectivity.

(iii) The post-Husserlian movement is on the rise, away from the "horizontal thinking" towards a "vertical thinking" that turns its investigation to the phenomena consciousness itself, which concerns the "appearance" and "concealing" of phenomenon. This reflection is characterized by the "self-negation" of subjectivity/consciousness in facing deeper nature of consciousness, or Heidegger's "Schritt zurück" (step back) (Nitta 1998, 151, also 156-57).

4. Nitta next places this "inward" (and "vertical") turn of phenomenology side by side with the ancient Indian Buddhist thought of Yogācāra school, which upheld that all phenomena are "mental representations." This is to "phenomenalize all things," (i.e., non-substantialize things), and as such its approach appears congenial with Husserlian phenomenology, although the Yogācāra starting point of the investigation and the aim are different, in that the ultimate aim was to "transform" the mundane consciousness into awakened consciousness to achieve "moksha" (liberation from the ills and sufferings caused by the egocentric worldview). (cf. Nitta 1998, 152-56)

5. Nitta, however, falls short of sorting out one essential Yogācāra point—the distinction of (a) "consciousness" (vijñāna), (b) "ego-maker" or "ego-tinted-consciousness" (manas), and (c) the "root consciousness" or "storehouse consciousness" (ālāya-vijñāna)—the last two layers of consciousness belonging to the realm of "subconscious." In Japanese, traditionally, these three "layers" of the mind ("kokoro") are termed as "shiki" 識, "i" 意, and "shin" 心 to distinguish their function. (Yusa 2023.)

6. Nitta's analysis of the Yogācāra's "three nature theory" (the three modes of cognition) is thus not complete, but nevertheless he succeeded in drawing important parallels between Husserl and Yogācāra, as for instance:

- the cognition the Yogācārins speak of is something akin to Husserl's notion of consciousness of the world and the consciousness that experiences the world
- the "cognition" in its broad meaning is none other than the place (basho) in which the world manifests itself as it does, but this cognition, when trapped in language, renders the world as reified and self-subsistent reality
- hence, the Yogācāra masters instructed their students to steer clear of the objectified reified notion of things, by freeing their mind from the linguistic activity that brings about the false view things as substantial (Nitta 1998, 154)

6.1. Concerning the "awakened" mode of viewing the world (one of the three natures of cognition that Yogācāra speaks of), called the "well-rounded view" (parinispāna svabhāva), Nitta explains it as referring to the "un-manifested world" 現れない世界 (nicht-enscheinende Welt), which "comes to pass" (genjō suru), when the world manifests itself at its momentum of "*me-on*" (世界の現れが非・存在と化すところに現成する). "This is the intuition of ālāya-vijñāna, which by definition cannot be objectified, and yet in which we see the truth," as Nitta puts it. (Nitta 1998, 156)

7. Going back to Nitta's observation of a new "direction" of post-Husserlian post-Heideggerian phenomenology, this "well-rounded view" of Yogācārins resonates with the recent phenomenological movements. Nitta especially mentions the summer colloquium on Fink that took place at Cerisy-la-Salle in Normandy, France, in 1994, where the participants paid special attention to the "*me-ontic*" (i.e., self-negating) "anonymous" activity that was at work behind how the humans and the world establish their relationship, which was present, although not articulated, in Husserl and Heidegger's thinking. Eugen Fink brought up this activity to the forefront of the phenomenological discourse, by considering human beings as the "medium" (baikaisha) (or "actors," Nishida would say). Nitta had been personally acquainted with Fink, and I believe he found himself in agreement with the former colleague-friend. (Nitta 1998, 110, n. 1)

8. Nitta next sees a remarkable coalescence of the "direction" of thought **that goes beyond** the old-fashioned way of doing "comparative philosophy," which groups and thereby separates, ideas into that of the East and the West. In the awareness of the possibility of a philosophical thought to reach the global height (or depth), Nitta identifies fresh untapped promises that Nishida's thinking houses in terms of *global* philosophical engagement, while he raises a few questions that Nishida may not have fully treated. (Nitta 1998, 162-64)

9. This present paper is a continuation of my Bogotá investigation (Yusa 2023), and to a great extent my response to Nitta's inquiry. Thus, I will turn to my own analysis of Nishida's infinite sphere in terms of the **four-fold (dialectical) aspectual world**. The notion of "infinite sphere" certainly goes back to Cusanus, Eckhart, et al., and it also resonates with the Buddhist cosmology. (Yusa 2022) Nishida sees this infinite sphere as constantly being molded in and through the interaction of the "actors" and "environment." My analysis of the "four-fold" aspectual world will provide an answer to Nitta's question of Nishida's thought. The view of the world as the radical mutual determination of the I and the world, and the I as the "medium" but also the "mirror" of the world (—the two aspects of "tsukurareta mono kara tsukuru mono e," and the contradictory self-identity of one and the many—each individual, irreducible, nevertheless coexists with other individuals in space-time-intelligibility continuum), could contribute to further discussion for the phenomenologists, while it could widen the appreciation of those who engage in Nishida's thought.